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SERIAL ENTREPRENEURS AND
SMALL BUSINESS BANKRUPTCIES
Douglas G. Baird* & Edward R Morrison**
Chapter 11 is thought to preserve the going-concern surplus of a financially distressed business-the extra value that its assets possess in their current configuration. Financialdistress leads to conflicts among creditors that
can lead to inefficient liquidation of a business with going-concern surplus.
Chapter 11 avoids this by providing the business with a way offashioning a
new capital structure. This account of Chapter 11 fails to capture what is
happening in the typical case. The typical Chapter 11 debtor is a small
corporationwhose assets are not specialized and rarely worth enough to pay
tax claims. There is no business worth saving and there are no assets to fight
over. The focal point is not the business, but the person who runs it. She is
a serial entrepreneur, searchingfor the business that best matches her skills.
For the vast majority of cases, then, Chapter 11 is best seen through the lens
of labor economics, not corporatefinance. Chapter 11 offers the entrepreneur
increased liquidity as well as a forum for renegotiatingdebts (such as unpaid withholding taxes) for which she as well as the corporation are liable.
But Chapter 11 offers these benefits only to entrepreneurs who remain with
their existing businesses. This lock-in effect is qualitatively no different from
the one commonly associated with rent control. These effects, as well as the
costs the process imposes on third parties, should be the focus of any assessment of how well Chapter 11 works.
INTRODUCTION

This Article presents a comprehensive study of businesses that make
up the Chapter 11 docket of a large bankruptcy court over the course of a
year.' The typical Chapter 11 cases are strikingly different from the cases
*
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1. Our study is the first of its type. The empirical works studying typical Chapter 11
cases to date have been largely mechanical time-and-motion studies of bankruptcy courts,
focusing on such questions as the length of each case and the number that resulted in a
successful plan of reorganization. Scant attention has been paid to the businesses
themselves beyond such matters as the number of creditors and the amount they are owed.
See generally Steven H. Ancel & Bruce A. Markell, Hope in the Heartland: Chapter 11
Dispositions in Indiana and Southern Illinois, 1990-1996, 50 S.C. L. Rev. 343 (1999)
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one ordinarily hears about. Instead of Uniteds, Enrons, or Kmarts, we see
small businesses. There are few assets beyond the entrepreneur's human
capital, and these rarely have more value inside the business than
outside. 2 It is therefore a mistake to ask whether the corporate entity that
is the subject of the bankruptcy case is worth saving. For small businesses,
the relevant unit of analysis is the owner and operator of the business, not
the business itself.
A small business is typically a spell in the life of its owner-operator.
The owner-operator's human capital is fully portable and is used to start a
string of businesses over her lifetime. She moves from business to business-often in the same industry-until finding a good match between
her human capital and a particular business model. 3 Much like the process of job shopping by workers, 4 this search is the process by which a
(reporting case outcome and duration); Samuel L. Bufford, Chapter 11 Case Management
and Delay Reduction: An Empirical Study, 4 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 85 (1996) (same, but
also reporting effects of a case management program on duration); Lisa Hill Fenning &
Craig A. Hart, Measuring Chapter 11: The Real World of 500 Cases, 4 Am. Bankr. Inst. L.
Rev. 119 (1996) (same, but also reporting demographic characteristics-e.g., whether
debtor was business or nonbusiness and, if business, its legal structure, total assets and
debt, and industrial classification); Stephen P. Ferris & Robert M. Lawless, The Expenses of
Financial Distress: The Direct Costs of Chapter 11, 61 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 629 (2000)
(reporting case outcome and duration, total assets and debt, and total fees); Elizabeth
Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Financial Characteristics of Businesses in Bankruptcy,
73 Am. Bankr. L.J. 499 (1999) [hereinafter Warren & Westbrook, Financial
Characteristics] (cataloging information listed on petitions and other schedules filed with
the bankruptcy court). Such studies reveal little about the nature of the underlying
business beyond what can be gleaned from the crude classification scheme on the
bankruptcy petition itself. This scheme does not, for example, distinguish an importer of
men's suits from a restaurant. This Article extends Edward R. Morrison, Bankruptcy
Decisionmaking: An Empirical Study of Continuation Bias in Small Business Bankruptcies,
J.L. & Econ. (forthcoming) (manuscript on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter
Morrison, Continuation Bias].
2. See Morrison, Continuation Bias, supra note 1 (manuscript at 8) (using 1998 data
on Chapter 11 filings in the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, and finding that
roughly 80% of businesses had fewer than twenty employees, 75% had less than $1 million
in assets, and about 50% had fewer than $100,000 in assets); Warren & Westbrook,
Financial Characteristics, supra note 1, at 529, 548 (using 1994 data on Chapter 11 filings
in twenty-three districts and finding that 75% of businesses had twenty-four or fewer
employees, 70% had less than $1 million in assets, and 50% had fewer than $351,000 in
assets). The characteristics of the typical Chapter 11 match those of small businesses
generally, which account for half of both GDP and nongoverment employment in the
United States. U.S. Small Bus. Admin., The Small Business Economy: A Report to the
President 5 (2004).
3. See generally ThomasJ. Holmes &James A. Schmitz, On the Turnover of Business
Firms and Business Managers, 103 J. Pol. Econ. 1005 (1995) [hereinafter Holmes &
Schmitz, Turnover] (presenting theoretical model illustrating this matching process);
Thomas J. Holmes & James A. Schmitz, Managerial Tenure, Business Age, and Small
Business Turnover, 14 J. Lab. Econ. 79 (1996) (presenting empirical evidence consistent
with implications of model).
4. Job shopping, unlike business shopping by entrepreneurs, has spawned a vast
literature. See, e.g., William R. Johnson, A Theory of Job Shopping, 92 Q.J. Econ. 261,
261-77 (1978); Boyan Jovanovic, Job Matching and the Theory of Turnover, 87 J. Pol.
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scarce resource (the owner's human capital) gravitates toward its most
productive use. The owner-operator's human capital is not tied to any
particular business enterprise; it can be redeployed when opportunities
outside the existing enterprise are more attractive than those inside,
which is precisely why most entrepreneurs are serial entrepreneurs. Just
as taking account ofjob mobility is a fundamental feature of employment
law, 5 serial entrepreneurship should be central to any discussion of small
business bankruptcies. 6 In the world of small businesses, Chapter 11 is
first and foremost a labor-market intervention.
The standard account of Chapter 11 has a very different focus. It
begins with a fundamental insight of corporate finance; 7 we must distinguish the question of who owns assets from the question of how they are
deployed. Chapter 11 comes into play when these two questions are confounded.8 A business that cannot pay its creditors has a problem with its
capital structure. No matter how well run, a business that generates operating income of $100 a year cannot support annual interest obligations of
Econ. 972, 972-90 (1979) [hereinafter Jovanovic, Job Matching]; Robert H. Topel &
Michael P. Ward, Job Mobility and the Careers of Young Men, 107 Q.J. Econ. 439, 439-79
(1992).
5. For example, there have been studies of the lock-in created by employer-provided
health insurance. See generally Jonathan Gruber & Brigitte Madrian, Health Insurance,
Labor Supply, and Job Mobility: A Critical Review of the Literature, in Health Policy and
the Uninsured 97 (Catherine McLaughlin ed., 2004) (reviewing vast literature on health
insurance, labor supply, and job mobility and discussing possible welfare implications).
6. The large Chapter 11 cases, while only a tiny fraction of all Chapter Ils, are
crucially different in this respect. In this context, a focus on the legal entity makes sense.
The business of WorldCom, United Airlines, or Kmart cannot be meaningfully separated
from the corporation (or, more precisely, corporate group) that files the bankruptcy
petition. The corporate entity that formally enters bankruptcy owns the assets, employs the
workers, and contracts with the rest of the world. Everyone understands, of course, that
the boundary between a business and the rest of the world is permeable and necessarily
fuzzy at the edges. See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305,
310-11 (1976) (suggesting that nature of firm as nexus for contracting relationships moots
discussions of precise corporate boundaries). Nevertheless, sorting out the rights and
obligations of the legal entity that houses a particular business is the principal challenge in
these cases.
7. See Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation
Finance, and the Theory of Investment, 48 Am. Econ. Rev. 261, 268-73 (1958) (setting out
conditions under which a company's value is independent of how much debt, as opposed
to equity, is in its capital structure); Merton H. Miller, The Modigliani-Miller Propositions
After Thirty Years, J. Econ. Persp., Fall 1988, at 99, 99-102 (noting acceptance of original
Modigliani-Miller propositions and discussing their impact on field of corporate finance).
8. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and
the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of
Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 97, 104-09 (1984); Frank H.
Easterbrook, Is Corporate Bankruptcy Efficient?, 27J. Fin. Econ. 411, 411 (1990); Robert
K. Rasmussen, The Ex Ante Effects of Bankruptcy Reform on Investment Incentives, 72
Wash. U. L.Q. 1159, 1161 (1994). For a general discussion of the relationship between
finance and corporate reorganizations, see generally John D. Ayer, The Role of Finance
Theory in Shaping Bankruptcy Policy, 3 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 53 (1995).
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$200. Such a business is in financial distress. This is a problem that goes
to the ownership of the assets, not the way they are used. Sorting out the
rights of competing creditors when there is not enough to pay them in
full does not mean that anything is unsound with the underlying business. Financially distressed businesses are not necessarily in economic
distress. 9 The archetypal example is the railroad. Even if it costs too
much to build, once built, its best use is as a railroad. The operating costs
are comparatively small and the assets-narrow strips of land and steel
rails-have little value in any other use. The railroad's assets are optimally deployed within the existing business structure even though it cannot pay what it owes.10
Again, according to the usual account, without bankruptcy law, the
problems with the capital structure (the ownership issue) lead to inefficient liquidations (an asset deployment issue). Chapter 11 ensures this
does not happen. It is a sorting mechanism.1 1 It aims to identify the
businesses that have greater value as going concerns than in piecemeal
liquidation and provide a process for these businesses to acquire a capital
structure consistent with their economic circumstances. The remaining
businesses-those without going-concern value-are filtered out and exposed to liquidation.
The tools of corporate finance also identify the costs of Chapter 11.
As it accomplishes its sorting function, Chapter 11 allows the owner of the
assets-the debtor-to make decisions about their deployment. As a result, one worries that Chapter 11 will distort ex ante investment decisions.
When the managers of the business are the shareholders, or are beholden to them, they may engage in strategic behavior that reduces the
creditors' payoffs in bankruptcy. 12 Anticipating this, creditors may be unwilling to invest in the business in the first place. Similarly, one worries
9. For an empirical study of large businesses that focuses explicitly on this distinction,
see generally Gregor Andrade & Steven N. Kaplan, How Costly Is Financial (Not
Economic) Distress? Evidence from Highly Leveraged Transactions that Became
Distressed, 53J. Fin. 1443 (1998).
10. For a discussion of railroad reorganizations as the precursor of modern Chapter
11, see David A. Skeel, Jr., Debt's Dominion 9, 48-70 (2001). For a discussion of financial
and economic distress, see Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy's Uncontested Axioms, 108 Yale
L.J. 573, 580-83 (1998).
11. See, e.g., MichelleJ. White, Corporate Bankruptcy as a Filtering Device: Chapter
11 Reorganizations and Out-of-Court Debt Restructurings, 10 J.L. Econ. & Org. 268, 268
(1994). Whether it is successful is a matter of debate. Cf. Timothy C.G. Fisher &Jocelyn
Martel, Empirical Estimates of Filtering Failure in Court-Supervised Reorganization, 1 J.
Empirical Legal Stud. 143, 145 (2004) (finding that corporate reorganizations in Canada,
which "share[ ] many feature [s] with" Chapter 11 reorganizations, allow "too many" firms
to restructure their debt).
12. See, e.g., Barry E. Adler, A Theory of Corporate Insolvency, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 343,
358-59, 367-68 (1997) (explaining that Chapter 11 and most proposed reforms are
inefficient, relative to regime allowing parties to contract about bankruptcy, because they
permit continuation of nonviable firms); Alan Schwartz, A Contract Theory Approach to
Business Bankruptcy, 107 Yale L.J. 1807, 1831-32 (1998) (showing that mandatory
bankruptcy regimes, including Chapter 11, raise ex ante cost of capital).
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that the managers' desire to keep their jobs will also delay the redeployment of assets that are best used elsewhere. 13 There may be alternatives
to Chapter 11 that take better advantage of capital markets. 14 Options
15
and derivatives can solve financial distress problems at low cost.
Thus runs the standard account. 16 But none of this matters in the
typical small business bankruptcy. Whatever filtering is done has nothing
13. See Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15J. Legal
Stud. 127, 139-41 (1986) (explaining that managers are biased toward reorganization as
opposed to liquidation even when latter is more efficient); Michael Bradley & Michael
Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 101 Yale LJ. 1043, 1050-51 (1992)
(arguing that benefit of saving going-concern value in Chapter 11 must be weighed against
risk that managers will make suboptimal and self-interested decisions during
reorganization); Lawrence A. Weiss & Karen H. Wruck, Information Problems, Conflicts of
Interest, and Asset Stripping: Chapter II's Failure in the Case of Eastern Airlines, 48 J.
Fin. Econ. 55, 58 (1998) (asserting that management's exclusive right to file plan of
reorganization in first 120 days of Chapter 11 case gives it opportunity to mismanage
company at expense of its creditors).
14. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for Corporate
Reorganization, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 527, 559-93 (1983) (proposing market-based
alternative in which reorganized firm's capital structure would consist entirely of equity,
which would be valued by floating a fraction of it on capital markets).
15. See generally Barry E. Adler & Ian Ayres, A Dilution Mechanism for Valuing
Corporations in Bankruptcy, 111 Yale L.J. 83 (2001) (setting forth particular options-based
mechanism as alternative to Chapter 11); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Approach to
Corporate Reorganizations, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 775 (1988) (same).
16. Alternative approaches to Chapter 11 emphasize goals beyond preserving goingconcern value. See, e.g., CharlesJ. Tabb, The Future of Chapter 11, 44 S.C. L. Rev. 791,
802-07 (1993). These approaches usually include arguments to the effect that a financially
distressed corporation should take account of every party with a stake in the business and
its future-not only creditors and shareholders, but workers, suppliers, customers, tort
victims, and anyone else the business affects. See, e.g., Karen Gross, Failure and
Forgiveness: Rebalancing the Bankruptcy System 248-49 (1997).
Bankruptcy's
distributional scheme should not merely respect the rights of investors, but also ensure
that workers, tort victims, and other nonadjusting creditors are treated fairly. Powerful
creditors should not be able to commandeer the process to advance their own interests to
the exclusion of others. As Warren and Westbrook put it:
[The current bankruptcy system] constrain[s] the collection rights of each
creditor individually in order to promote a somewhat more efficient liquidation
or reorganization for the benefit of all concerned. This is accomplished by
shrinking the collection rights of the most powerful creditors in order to achieve
somewhat greater distribution among all those who have a stake in the debtor.
Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Contracting out of Bankruptcy: An
Empirical Intervention, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1197, 1200-01 (2005) [hereinafter Warren &
Westbrook, Contracting]. Bankruptcy judges must retain sufficient discretion to ensure a
collective process that brings everyone to the table. A Chapter 11 corporate reorganization
is a collective process in which interested parties take stock of the business and decide on
its future. See Donald R. Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values: Ajurisprudence of Bankruptcy,
91 Colum. L. Rev. 717, 765-71 (1991) (discussing presence of a "competition of diverse
human values that are fundamentally incommensurable" in each bankruptcy case).
Much of the work in this vein articulates these other goals and the need to balance
everything simultaneously in terms so vague and abstract as to admit of no contradiction.
See, e.g., id. at 722 (describing bankruptcy as a kind of "group therapy," or "a system with
varied contours and dimensions, having the distinct function of facilitating the expression
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to do with preserving going-concern value, as there are few, if any, specialized assets 17 and the entrepreneur can (and often does) recreate the
same business at little or no cost.1 8 Distortions of ex ante investment decisions are irrelevant when the dominant creditor is a taxing authority,
not a market actor making an investment decision. 19 And, as there are
few physical assets and even fewer specialized assets, ensuring efficient
redeployment of assets is not a primary concern either. When there are
few assets other than human capital, it makes no sense to focus on the
corporate entity and its capital structure. The focus should instead be on
the owner-operator, around whom the business is organized. In the
world of small business, labor economics rather than corporate finance
20
provides the relevant tools.
Seen from the vantage point of labor economics, a Chapter 11 corporate reorganization is just one of many government policies targeting
small businesses, such as the Small Business Administration's loan, invest22
ment, and bonding programs. 2 1 Its benefits include "breathing space,"
temporary liquidity, 23 greater bargaining power with particular creditors
and recognition of those diverse values important in dealing with financial distress");
Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 775, 811 (1987) ("I have offered a
dirty, complex, elastic, interconnected view of bankruptcy from which I can neither predict
outcomes nor even necessarily fully articulate all the factors relevant to a policy decision.").
Nevertheless, these approaches focus squarely on the business and its future. See, e.g.,
Warren & Westbrook, Contracting, supra, at 1254 ("Bankruptcy is the forum in which our
society makes its final decisions about the life and death of a business and who gets what.
To that forum come bank lenders and pensioners, tort victims and trade creditors,...
each with a different economic relationship with the debtor.").
Such approaches, like the standard law and economics critique, are centered on the
business and keeping it alive. This focus makes no sense in the context of the typical case.
The focus should be on the owner-operator rather than the legal entity that houses the
business or its general creditors who will, in any event, be left with nothing. Only by
understanding the benefits that Chapter 11 brings the owner-operator (and the
corresponding costs it imposes on her as well as others) can we begin to assess the current
system and how it works in the typical case.
17. See infra Part II.A.1.
18. See infra Part II.A.2.
19. See infra Part III.C.4.
20. A seminal work in this literature is Gary S. Becker, Human Capital: A Theoretical
and Empirical Analysis, with Special Reference to Education (3d ed. 1993).
21. See U.S. Small Bus. Admin., SBA's Role in Providing Financial Assistance to
America's Small Businesses, at http://www.sba.gov/financing/basics/sbarole.html (last
visited Sept. 18, 2005) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing each program in
detail).
22. Although Chapter 11 (and bankruptcy law generally) is frequently described as
"breathing space" for debtors, e.g., A. Mechele Dickerson, The Many Faces of Chapter 11:
A Reply to Professor Baird, 12 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 109, 116 n.42 (2004); George G.
Triantis, The Interplay Between Liquidation and Reorganization in Bankruptcy: The Role
of Screens, Gatekeepers, and Guillotines, 16 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 101, 110 (1996), we stress
the Code's function as breathing space not for the corporate debtor but for its owneroperator.
23. Debt service is generally suspended during the pendency of the case. 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(a) (2000).
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(especially landlords), and an opportunity to renegotiate debts-owed to
banks and the Internal Revenue Service-that have been personally guar24
anteed by the owner-operator.
While most programs designed to aid small entrepreneurs are available to any business that is sufficiently small, 25 Chapter 11 provides its benefits in a way that is narrow and arbitrary. Entrepreneurs must remain
with their current business to enjoy Chapter 1l's benefits. 26 Hence,
Chapter 11 encourages entrepreneurs who do business in corporate form
to remain with that particular corporate form longer than they might otherwise. This lock-in effect is the principal cost of the small business bankruptcy and yet it has been wholly neglected in the literature.
One can argue that Chapter 11 facilitates the transition from one
business to another, and that the bankruptcy process smoothes the entrepreneur's path. Chapter 11 might overcome bargaining failures that un27
dermine out-of-court workouts between a business and a lending bank.
Alternatively, Chapter 11 might be an effective way to renegotiate owneroperators' personal guarantees of their corporations' indebtedness. The
bank may be willing to renegotiate the guarantee, particularly because
the owner is a serial entrepreneur who will likely succeed in a future business, but be unwilling to do so without credible evidence that the original
business has failed. Chapter 11 may offer a relatively low-cost mechanism
for verifying the assets of the business and assessing their value. 28

24. We discuss these benefits in detail in Part III. The owner-operator "guarantees"
that withholding taxes are turned over to the IRS in the sense that the IRS imposes on
individuals a "trust fund recovery penalty" equal to the amount of unpaid taxes for
businesses whose affairs they controlled. I.R.C. § 6672 (Thomson 2005).
25. "Small" is defined in terms of employment (e.g., less than 500 employees for most
manufacturing and mining industries) or average annual receipts (e.g., less than $6
million for most retail and service industries). See U.S. Small Bus. Admin., Frequently
Asked Questions (FAQs) About Small Business Size Standards, at http://www.sba.gov/
size/indexfaqs.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2005) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
26. The focus in this Article is on corporate reorganizations, not on the ability of
individual entrepreneurs to discharge personal indebtedness and thereby obtain a "fresh
start." Individuals can use Chapter 11 as well as Chapter 7 and, when used for this purpose
by flesh and blood individuals, Chapter 11 does not tie entrepreneurs to a particular
business venture. Indeed, as shown below, see infra notes 39, 50, the presence of the lockin effect in corporate Chapter Hs, but not individual Chapter 11s, renders seriously
problematic any study of Chapter 11 that conflates the two.
27. Ayotte argues that bankruptcy law can play an important role in helping
entrepreneurs obtain efficient levels of debt forgiveness. See Kenneth M. Ayotte,
Bankruptcy and Entrepreneurship: The Value of a Fresh Start, 23 J.L. Econ. & Org.
(forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 3-5, on file with the Columbia Law Review), available at
http://wwwl .gsb.columbia.edu/mygsb/faculty/research/pubfiles/726/freshst-jleo-904.pdf.
28. Arguments along these lines have been made by Ronald M. Giammarino, The
Resolution of Financial Distress, 2 Rev. Fin, Stud. 25, 28-30 (1989), and David C. Webb,
The Importance of Incomplete Information in Explaining the Existence of Costly
Bankruptcy, 54 Economica 279, 284-87 (1987).
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But it is equally plausible that Chapter 11 hinders the transition from
one business to another. Rewarding entrepreneurs to stay put is suspect.
Few would advocate for a policy that forgives an individual's tax liabilities
only if she remains with her current employer. Yet Chapter 11 has precisely the same structure. Indeed, it closely resembles rent control. Rent
control prevents landlords from raising the rent on existing tenants and
thereby induces tenants to stay too long in an otherwise undesirable
apartment.29 Chapter 11 may likewise encourage entrepreneurs to stay
too long with the wrong business.3 0
As we assess the costs and benefits of Chapter 11 in the typical case,
we should also be careful not to exaggerate the stakes. Perhaps only ten
to fifteen percent of all failing businesses ever file a bankruptcy petition. 31 An even smaller fraction use Chapter 11.32 For the typical corpo3
rations that enter Chapter 11, the benefits and costs are both modest.
29. See, e.g., Edward L. Glaeser & Erzo F.P. Luttmer, The Misallocation of Housing
Under Rent Control, 93 Am. Econ. Rev. 1027, 1031 (2003).
30. The effect is, of course, not limited to rent control and Chapter 11. It happens
whenever the law induces people to keep assets longer than they would otherwise.
Another example is taxation of realized, but not unrealized, appreciation in the value of an
asset. Because the tax has to be paid only when the asset is sold, it encourages investors to
hold onto appreciating assets. See David A. Weisbach, An Efficiency Analysis of Line
Drawing in the Tax Law, 29 J. Legal Stud. 71, 72 (2000).
31. It appears that only a small fraction of troubled businesses ever file a bankruptcy
petition. Reliable data on this issue is unavailable. Among other things, identifying what
counts as a discrete business is elusive. Millions who are employed full-time by someone
else earn some income on the side. Each of these sidelines, or indeed anything that
generates Schedule C income, might be considered a discrete business. Dun & Bradstreet,
a supplier of credit ratings and other business information, appears to apply a less
expansive definition; its data indicate that for every one hundred businesses that close
their doors, only ten to fifteen will ever file a bankruptcy petition. See Leora Klapper et al.,
Business Environment and Firm Entry: Evidence from International Data, at Annex 3
(Nat'l Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10380, 2004), available at http://
www.nber.org/papers/w10380.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review). These liquidityconstrained businesses are surely deterred by the prospect of paying thousands of dollars
of upfront legal fees merely to file a petition. A business will often pay over $5,000 upfront
merely to obtain the assistance of an attorney. Telephone Interview with Karen J. Porter,
Partner, The Law Offices of Karen J. Porter (Oct. 29, 2004). Ms. Porter and her former
business, Minchella & Porter, represented six percent of the businesses in our study.
32. Most business bankruptcy filings are made under Chapter 7, not Chapter 11.
During the twelve months ending September 2004, for example, the courts received 34,817
business filings. Only 9,436 of these were filed under Chapter 11; 20,234 were filed under
Chapter 7. Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Judicial Business of the United States Courts
2004, at tbl.F-2, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2004/contents.html
(last
visited Sept. 18, 2005) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
33. The primary focus of this Article is the lock-in effect, which is an indirect cost of
the bankruptcy process. We should not, however, neglect the direct costs. During the
pendency of a Chapter 11 case, median (mean) administrative costs will amount to about
2% (17%) of a business's total assets, as measured at the time of the petition. See Arturo
Bris et al., The Costs of Bankruptcy 19 & tbl.9 (Yale Int'l Ctr. for Fin., Working Paper No.
04-13, 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=523562 (on
file with the Columbia Law Review) (using combined data on large and small Chapter 1 Is
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The "breathing space" is short-lived: Judges identify and shut down most
failing businesses within six months.3 4 Moreover, the businesses that remain in Chapter l Ithe longest (and where lock-in is potentially the most
costly) are usually those businesses in which the serial entrepreneur can
match his or her human capital with a business within the same corporate
shell. 35 These are typically situations in which the business has suffered
distress as a result of overexpansion (such as opening a second store that
fails). The socially optimal strategy for the entrepreneur is to shed the
excess capacity and retreat to the core business that she once ran successfully. Staying with the same business therefore imposes few costs. She is
like the tenant who would continue to live in the same apartment even
without rent control; there is no efficiency loss when tenants living in
rent-controlled apartments are the same tenants who would pay the most
36
to live in those apartments.
A change in academic and political debates about Chapter 11 is in
order. We need to move the debate about Chapter 11 and its effects on
particular businesses to one that focuses squarely on the serial entrepreneur. Chapter 11 should help (or at least not distort) the efforts of entrepreneurs to find businesses that best suit their skills. It can do this best by
providing an efficient forum for resolving disputes and disposing of assets. Current academic thinking about small business bankruptcy pushes
in exactly the wrong direction by promoting the business, not the
entrepreneur.
Part I describes our methodology and our dataset. Part II shows that
small businesses in bankruptcy generally lack specialized assets and, as a
result, have little going-concern surplus. These findings indicate that
Chapter 11 serves no purpose if it focuses on preserving the entity that
houses nonspecialized assets. They also raise questions about the reasons
why owner-operators find Chapter 11 attractive. If the Code does not
play an important role in preserving going-concern surplus, why do entrepreneurs ever put their businesses in Chapter 11? Part III explores several possible answers, all of which underscore the principal and altogether neglected cost of Chapter 11: It discourages small entrepreneurs
from exiting existing businesses and finding new, sometimes better
matches with their human capital-either a new business or an employment opportunity.

filed in Arizona and Southern District of New York between 1995 and 2001). Whether
these are large or small is hard to say, given that a financially distressed business will face
some costs in any event. But the lock-in effect of Chapter 11 will induce entrepreneurs to
incur higher direct costs in order to secure the benefits of Chapter 11.
34. Morrison, Continuation Bias, supra note 1 (manuscript at 12-13).
35. See infra Part III.C.4.
36. See Glaeser & Luttmer, supra note 29, at 1030-31.
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THE WORLD OF CORPORATE CHAPTER 11

When a flesh and blood entrepreneur files her own personal bankruptcy petition either in Chapter 7 or Chapter 11, the principal consequence is the discharge of her individual debt.3 7 Bankruptcy's fresh start
unequivocally facilitates her search for a new business because the fresh
start is not in any way conditioned on continuing the old business. 38 Corporate Chapter lls, the cases of interest to us, are dramatically different.
When the entrepreneur places her corporation in bankruptcy, her personal debts are unaffected. Whatever benefits the entrepreneur enjoys
from Chapter 11 are conditioned upon the old corporation remaining
intact. Because it ties her fate to the business, regardless of whether it
makes sense for her to remain there, Chapter 11 can interfere with the
entrepreneur's effort to find the right match for her human capital. 39
A. Methodology and Data
This Article examines the docket of one bankruptcy court over the
course of a single year, the corporate Chapter 11 cases filed in the Eastern Division of the Northern District of Illinois (Northern District) during calendar year 1998. The Northern District's jurisdiction encompasses
Chicago, Cook County, and outlying areas-a large and diverse economy. 40 Relative to the economy of the country as a whole, there is less
37. For an overview of consumer bankruptcy, see generally Douglas C. Baird,
Elements of Bankruptcy 30-61 (3d ed. 2001) [hereinafter Baird, Elements of Bankruptcy].
38. Fan and White, for example, show that homeowning families are significantly
more likely to own a business and to start new businesses if they live in states with high or
unlimited Chapter 7 exemption levels than if they live in states with low exemption levels.
Wei Fan & Michelle J. White, Personal Bankruptcy and the Level of Entrepreneurial
Activity, 46 J.L. & Econ. 543, 556 (2003).
39. It is for this reason that this Article focuses exclusively on corporate Chapter 11
cases. Pooling corporate and individual Chapter 11 cases together, as other studies do, is a
serious mistake. See, e.g., Warren & Westbrook, Contracting, supra note 16, at 1208
("Debtors in the sample [used in the article] are a mix of human beings, partnerships,
corporations, and other forms of legal entities."). It masks the most important features of
Chapter 11 as it applies to corporate and individual debtors respectively. Of course, to
understand what was happening in corporate Chapter 11 cases, we need to know whether
the owner of the business filed a personal bankruptcy petition herself, either at the same
time as the Chapter 11, before it, or afterwards. This is one of the many pieces of
information we gathered for our database. Real estate ventures also file Chapter 11
petitions, but typically involve investment vehicles with a single creditor and no operating
business. See Douglas G. Baird, Remembering Pine Gate, 38 J. Marshall L. Rev. 5, 15-16
(2004) (stating that most Chapter 11 cases concern "[s]mall businesses and failed real
estate deals," and that most real estate bankruptcies involve only two people, a secured
creditor and an investor "with a leaky tax shelter"). Looking at all types of cases is,
however, appropriate in an empirical study of the bankruptcy process itself. See, e.g.,
Douglas G. Baird & Edward R. Morrison, Adversary Proceedings in Bankruptcy: A
Sideshow, Am. Bankr. L.J. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 22-31, on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (examining both consumer and corporate bankruptcy cases in study of
adversary proceedings in bankruptcy and identifying differences between them).
40. See Morrison, Continuation Bias, supra note 1 (manuscript at 5).
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agriculture and more manufacturing, but it is as suitable a place as any to
take the pulse of economic activity generally and corporate Chapter 11
cases in particular. 41 Calendar year 1998 is recent enough that the
docket is accessible electronically, but far enough in the past such that we
can see what happened to the business once Chapter 11 had run its
course.

42

The Northern District was also chosen because of the rich supply of
data. The court'sjudges permitted access to a database 43 containing copies of every filing and judicial order in these cases. We reviewed the
docket of each case, including the bankruptcy petition, the schedules,
and any filings (such as disclosure statements) that discuss the underlying
business. These sources give detailed information about each business's
finances (assets, debt, cash flow, etc.), history (including events that led
to the bankruptcy petition), experience in bankruptcy (e.g., time in bankruptcy, types of motions filed by the debtor and its creditors, types of
court orders), and information about the career history of the owneroperator.
We augmented this career-history information using data collected
by the Secretary of State of Illinois and made available on LexisNexis,
such as whether the owner-operator in a Chapter 11 case established
other businesses, the nature of these businesses, and their histories. We
then returned to the bankruptcy court files and searched for any other
bankruptcy petitions filed by the same corporation or the principal of the
corporation. We also consulted newspaper stories about the businesses
and the people running them. When necessary, we contacted the principals of these businesses or those who succeeded them, purchased the business's assets, or leased the same premises. When necessary, we also visited the businesses themselves.
The Northern District's bankruptcy judges are highly respected professionals. Its members in 1998 included prominent members of the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges, the American College of Bankruptcy, and the National Bankruptcy Conference. 44 One was later
41. See id. (showing that Northern District is similar to other large, metropolitan
areas across the country).
42. This was a time of relative economic prosperity, so our data describe the typical
cases that arise in nonrecessionary times. Bankruptcy cases in bad times might, of course,
look different.
43. The database, Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER), can be
accessed for a fee at http://www.pacer.uscourts.gov (last visited Sept. 18, 2005). The
Northern District waived the fee for this study.
44. Eugene R. Wedoff is a member of the National Bankruptcy Conference and the
American College of Bankruptcy. Am. Coll. of Bankr., Directory-Eugene R. Wedoff, at
http://www.amercol.org/dir/bio.cfm?id=519 (last visited Aug. 29, 2005) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review); Nat'l Bankr. Conference, Judge Eugene R. Wedoff, at http://
www.nationalbankruptcyconference.org/bios/wedoff.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2005) (on
file with the Columbia Law Review). He also serves on the Board of Governors of the
National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges. Id. Robert Ginsberg (now retired) was also a
member of the American College of Bankruptcy, Am. Coll. of Bankr., Directory-Robert
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appointed to the District Court. 45 There is little danger that the peculiarities or eccentricities of this bench distorted the types of cases filed

there. 46 For these reasons, we believe our sample is representative of
small business Chapter 11 cases and, at least in industrial composition,
representative of small businesses generally.
TABLE 1: SAMPLE SELECTION

Initial sample
Deletions or consolidations:
Individual debtor cases
Single asset real estate cases
Sister companies
Repeat filings
Large, publicly traded businesses
Businesses without owner-managers
Simultaneous involuntary petitions
Final sample

Petitions
184
(42)
(22)
(7)
(4)
(2)
(2)
(1)
104

As Table 1 indicates, the Northern District received 184 Chapter 11
filings during 1998. For this Article, we focus on a subset of these filings:
small corporations owned and operated by the same person-the owneroperator. 47 Table 1 also shows that we consolidated seven filings by sister
companies (the court consolidated these cases as well), and eliminated
E. Ginsberg, at http://www.amercol.org/dir/bio.cfm?id=178 (last visited Sept. 18, 2005)
(on file with the Columbia Law Review), the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges, id.,
the National Bankruptcy Conference, Nat'l Bankr. Conference, Hon. Robert E. Ginsberg,
at http://www.nationalbankruptcyconference.org/bios/ginsberg.htm (last visited Sept. 18,
2005) (on file with the Columbia Law Review), and Vice-Chair of the National Bankruptcy
Review Commission, Nat'l Bankr. Review Comm'n, Commission Members and Staff, at
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nbrc/members.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2005) (on file
with the Columbia Law Review). Ronald Barliant (now in private practice) was similarly a
member of the American College of Bankruptcy, Am. Coll. of Bankr., Directory-Ronald
Barliant, at http://www.amercol.org/dir/bio.cfm?id=623 (last visited Sept. 18, 2005) (on
file with the Columbia Law Review), and the Board of the National Conference of
Bankruptcy Judges, Goldberg Kohn, Attorneys at Law: Ronald Barliant
3, at http://
www.goldbergkohn.com/Bio/RonaldBarliant.asp (last visited Sept. 18, 2005) (on file with
the Columbia Law Review).
45. Joan Humphrey Lefkow was appointed to the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois; she received her commission on July 11, 2000. Fed. Judicial Ctr.,
Lefkow, Joan Humphrey, at http://air.fjc.gov/servlet/tGetlnfo?jid=2882 (last visited Aug.
16, 2005) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
46. There are two potential distortions worth noting. First, the motions practice of
the Northern District is somewhat different from that of other courts. As one of us has
discussed elsewhere, this motions practice may have the effect of making the court more
responsive to abuses or more likely to dismiss cases early in the process. See Morrison,
Continuation Bias, supra note 1 (manuscript at 14 n.35). Second, the IRS is a large
presence in our cases. Id. To the extent that local IRS practices vary (and are known to
vary), this too could affect the population of cases that file in the Northern District.
47. Our dataset includes twenty-two real estate cases and forty-two filings by flesh and
blood individuals. For the reasons noted above, we are not focusing on them in this
Article.
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four repeat filings by the same businesses and one involuntary petition
filed days before the business filed its own voluntary petition. Finally, we
eliminated two filings by large, publicly traded corporations and two filings by moderately sized corporations that were not owner managed.
The two publicly traded corporations had over seven hundred employees
each, far more than the five-hundred-employee cutoff used by the Small
Business Administration as an indicator of a "small business. '48 The two
moderately sized businesses had fewer than five hundred employees but
were different from the other businesses in this study because they exhibited the classic separation of ownership and control associated with large
corporations. 49 It should be noted, however, that the results reported
below are unaffected by the exclusion of these moderately sized businesses. After making these exclusions and consolidations, our sample of
Chapter 11 filings falls from 184 to 104 observations.
The cases in our sample are, to the extent we can tell, similar to
Chapter 11 cases filed elsewhere in terms of the amount of debt, the
50
amount of assets, and other characteristics reported in other studies.
48. See supra note 25.
49. By "separation of ownership and control" we mean the decision by the owners of a
business to allocate decisionmaking authority to agents (managers) who own only a
fraction of the business and, therefore, bear only a fraction of the costs and benefits of
their decisions. This phenomenon is a fundamental characteristic of modern corporations
and a central focus of modern corporate finance scholarship, as emphasized by Berle and
Means, and Jensen and Meckling, among others. See Adolf A. Berle & Gardiner C. Means,
The Modern Corporation and Private Property 127-52 (1932); Jensen & Meckling, supra
note 6, at 308-10. The two large, publicly traded corporations-Mercury Finance and First
Enterprise Financial Group-exhibited such separation: The owners were widely
dispersed shareholders; the managers held minority ownership interests. The two
moderately sized businesses-Tradetech Americas and Abtox, Inc-exhibited the same
separation. Only 35% of Abtox's equity was held by directors of the corporation; the rest
was owned by a broad range of pension funds, insurance companies, and individual
investors. Statement of Financial Affairs Item 19, In re AbTox, Inc., No. 98-22583 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. July 22, 1998). Although about 70% of Tradetech's equity was held by its top
three executives when creditors filed an involuntary petition, List of Equity Security
Holders, In re Tradetech Ams., Inc., No. 98-21105 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Dec. 1, 1999), control
over the corporation was in the hands of other investors. On July 10, 1998, the day after
Tradetech's Chapter 11 filing, the top executives were replaced. Statement of Financial
Affairs at Item 20.b, In re Tradetech Ars., No. 98-21105. Six months later the firm was sold
to one of its institutional investors. See Order Approving Disclosure Statement,
Confirming Debtor's Plan of Liquidation, and Authorizing Sale of Certain Assets out of the
Ordinary Course of Business, In re Tradetech Ans., No. 98-21105; see also Motion for
Approval of Sale of Assets and for Related Relief at 6, In re Tradetech Ans., No. 98-21105
(explaining that substantially all of debtor's assets would be sold to a corporation headed
by Richard Lynch, who had been one of debtor's directors).
50. See Morrison, Continuation Bias, supra note I (manuscript at 8-10) (comparing
1998 data on Northern District to data presented in other studies of Chapter 11). As
shown there, conclusions about the comparability of our sample to cases filed in other
bankruptcy courts are necessarily tentative. Id. Our work can be compared with other
studies using only the crude classifications on the bankruptcy petition itself, as other
scholars typically have not gone beyond them. See supra note 1. Nevertheless, wherever
others have gone beyond the face of the petition, their findings are consistent with ours.
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Indeed, the businesses themselves look much like businesses as a whole in
the economy. By examining Tables 2 and 3 together, we can compare
the characteristics of businesses in our sample to those of corporations in
the 1998 Survey of Small Business Finance (SSBF), a representative national sample of small businesses administered by the Federal Reserve
Board. 51 The industry composition of businesses in our sample differs
from the distribution of SSBF corporations in a few respects. Wholesale
Trade is underrepresented in our sample; Eating and Drinking Places
and Business Services are overrepresented. The percentage of businesses
with fewer than twenty employees is about the same, around 80%, in both
samples. Relative to SSBF businesses, however, the ones in our sample
are markedly younger: The median age is 6.8 years, relative to 13 years in
the SSBF. And, not surprisingly, the businesses in our sample have fewer
assets, more debt, and much more leverage than the average business in
the SSBF. In short, the distressed businesses in our sample are somewhat
smaller, younger, and more concentrated in the eating and drinking and
services sectors. 52 Similar patterns characterize corporate Chapter 7 fil53
ings in the Northern District.
For example, Sullivan et al. supplemented data from the petitions and schedules with
telephone interviews, and their findings are consistent with our finding that the principals
of Chapter 11 corporate debtors are serial entrepreneurs. See Teresa A. Sullivan et al.,
Financial Difficulties of Small Businesses and Reasons for Their Failure 30 (U.S. Small Bus.
Admin., Working Paper No. SBA-95-0403, 1998), available at http://www.sba.gov/advo/
research/rs188tot.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (finding that three-quarters
of debtors have previous experience as an owner or manager of another business). This
study, however, looked at debtors in Chapters 7, 11, and 13 and did not distinguish
corporate debtors from individuals for the purposes of its analysis. Id. at 5, 17-18. Some
of the debtors whom they found to have started new businesses likely were associated with
corporations that had filed Chapter 11 petitions, but there is no way to know how many.
Again, one can draw only limited inferences from a dataset that fails to distinguish between
individuals and corporations. This is especially true with respect to an issue where,
depending on whether the debtor is an individual or a corporation, the Bankruptcy Code
pushes in opposite directions, in the former case facilitating the search for a match
between human capital and the right business, and in the latter case putting a brake on it.
See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
51. For more information about this survey, see Marianne P. Bitler et al., Financial
Services Used by Small Businesses: Evidence from the 1998 Survey of Small Business
Finances, 87 Fed. Res. Bull. 183, 183 (2001) (explaining that SSBF is the "most
comprehensive source" for information on finances of small businesses).
52. That eating and drinking establishments are overrepresented in bankruptcy
squares with anecdotal evidence, but again one must caution against generalizing. Other
empirical studies of Chapter 11 do not look at the underlying businesses enough to even
know how many are eating and drinking establishments. See, e.g., Warren & Westbrook,
Financial Characteristics, supra note 1, at 529-32 (reporting only broad business
categories-e.g., "Retail/Wholesale," "Manufacturing/Mining"-listed on face sheets of
bankruptcy filings); Bris et al., supra note 33 (not reporting industrial characteristics of
sample businesses).
53. We confirmed this by randomly sampling 75 of the more than 300 corporate
Chapter 7 filings from the Northern District in 1998. We identified these filings by
searching court records for cases in which the debtor's name included "Co.," "Corp.,"
"Inc.," or another identifier of a corporate entity. These filings matched the Chapter 11
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STATISTICS, CORPORATE CHAPTER 11 FILINGS IN NORTHERN

DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS DURING
Age in

1998

Asset
Value, $
median
(mean)
(sd)

Debt, $
median
(mean) (sd)

(12.5)

467,201
(1,236,721)

823,977
(2,797,048)

2.8
(4.6)

28.4
(31.6)

405,163
(1,541,870)

1,130,172
(11,300,000)

(5.7)

4.5

103,350
(103,350)

253,512
(378,912)

1.8
(1.8)

(8.4)

24,826
(176,217)

1,210,366
(1,022,860)

(29.1)

U nder 20
En Lployees,
% (sd)

years
median
(mean)
(sd)
7.0

Leverage, %
median
(mean)

Industry
(SIC No.)

(freg)

Construction
(15-17)

13.5
(14)

76.9

Manufacturing
(20-39)

11.5
(12)

91.7

Transportation
(40-48)

3.9
(4)

100.0

Wholesale
Trade
(4813, 50-51)

2.9

100.0

Retail Trade
(52-59)

13.5
(14)

71.4

6.5
(11.5)

221,116
(950,756)

1,230,304
(2,425,506)

3.1
(6.3)

Eating and
Drinking Places

18.3
(19)

71.4

3.5
(11.7)

56,172
(204,455)

272,882
(705,415)

5.2
(6.1)

(5.3)

(3)

10.1

(sd)

3.3

7.3

(58)
Insurance and
Finance
(60-69)

2.9

(3)

13.1
(12.5)

26,652
(24,332)

341,012
(1,521,263)

20.1
(44.5)

Business
Services
(47-49, 70-79)

17.3
(18)

7.3
(9.9)

149,225
(686,330)

515,238
(828,243)

2.4
(12.4)

Professional
Services

16.4
(17)

6.8
(9.8)

130,970
(367,101)

382,518
(800,685)

2.6
(46.4)

6.8
(13.1)

148,090
(715,532)
(1,539,281)

550,048
(2,513,199)
(10,700,000)

3.3
(15.7)
(65.02)

(80-89)
TOTAL

100.0
(104)

81.5
(39.02)

(16.11)

If we look closely at the bankruptcy experience of the businesses in
our sample, some important patterns emerge. Table 4 shows that the
majority of these (62.5%) will be shut down in bankruptcy or will have
their petitions dismissed and thereby be exposed to liquidation under
state law. In other words, in over 60% of the cases, Chapter 11 "fails" in
the sense that the distressed business leaves Chapter 11 with its problems
unresolved. In another eight cases (7.7%), the business is sold off as a
going concern. In still another eight cases, the debtor solves the
problems that brought it into bankruptcy (such as a threat of eviction by
the landlord) without going through the process of confirming a formal
plan of reorganization (such as reaching a side deal with the landlord).
In only 23 of the 104 cases (22.1%) do we see something resembling a
traditional reorganization, and only 14 of these remain in business, as
Table 5 shows. In the others, the reorganized business subsequently
cases in debts, assets, age, number of employees, and other characteristics. In observing
this, however, we are not claiming that they are identical. The Chapter 7 cases, for
example, included twice as many construction businesses and half as many restaurants.
Again, different forces are at work.
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1998 SSBF

SUMMARY STATISTICS, CORPORATIONS IN
(EXCLUDING MINING AND REAL ESTATE)
Age in
years
median
(mean)
(se)

Asset
Value, $
median
(mean)
(se)

Debt, $
median
(mean)

Leverage
median
(mean)

Industry
(SIC No.)

%
(freg)

Under 20
Employees
% (se)

(se)

(se)

Construction
(15-17)

11.2
(187)

80.6
(2.79)

14
(14.6)
(.94)

520,706
(756,062)
(131,399)

317,040
(544,899)
(109,672)

.74
(.72)

(.059)

Manufacturing
(20-39)

11.7
(287)

71.1
(3.07)

15
(14.6)
(.83)

1,682,902
(1,499,328)
(170,572)

796,000
(854,470)
(99,758)

(.57)
(.032)

Transportation
(40-48)

3.3
(74)

75.2
(5.30)

11.5
(10.5)

(1.59)

834,219
(953,939)
(228,740)

673,488
(668,717)
(146,548)

(.094)

Wholesale
Trade
(4813, 50-51)

11.3
(179)

84.4
(2.45)

14
(14.7)
(1.38)

795,000
(1,149,670)
(151,521)

400,000
(732,278)
(125,948)

.54
(.64)
(.080)

Retail Trade
(52-59)

15.2
(263)

84.0
(2.11)

15
(14.7)

(.91)

360,000
(764,249)
(97,563)

203,000
(474,712)
(66,630)

.64
(.62)
(.069)

Eating and
Drinking Places
(58)

3.6
(102)

59.2
(6.05)

14.5
(13.2)
(1.10)

254,667
(306,869)
(53,990)

138,875
(172,569)
(28,709)

(.56)
(.084)

Insurance and
Finance
(60-69)

2.7
(35)

91.5
(3.59)

13
(17.4)
(2.28)

116,880
(368,816)
(92,524)

121,000
(570,641)
(226,090)

(1.55)

Business
Services
(47-49, 70-79)

23.9
(372)

90.3
(1.31)

10
(11.9)
(.56)

141,273
(376,597)
(65,905)

71,891
(262,987)
(64,171)

.55
(.70)
(.173)

Professional
Services
(80-89)

17.1
(305)

86.2
(1.83)

12
(13.4)
(.75)

123,214
(373,878)
(87,058)

64,849
(231,567)
(52,637)

(.62)
(.119)

100.0
(1804)

83.1
(0.56)

13.0
(13.7)
(.323)

320,971
(713,023)
(36,472)

191,660

.59

(462,848)
(29,056)

(.65)
(.034)

TOTAL

.59

.73

(.70)

.61

.70
(.663)

.55

Note: Reported means are estimates of population averages (with associated standard errors) and were
computed using survey weights. Reported medians are simply the 50th percentile of the raw,
unweighted data.

failed and either filed another bankruptcy petition or was liquidated
under state law. Failure typically occurred within two and a half years of
reorganization.
B. Viewing Chapter 11 Outcomes Through the Lens of Labor Economics
Do these different legal outcomes matter? Does the success or failure of Chapter 11 affect the economic productivity of the business?
These are generally thought to be easy questions with an obvious answer-namely, that a business will die and its productivity disappear if its
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4:

BANKRUPTCY OUTCOMES, BY INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION

Industry (SIC No.)
Construction
(15-17)
Manufacturing
(20-39)
Transportation
(40-48)
Wholesale Trade
(4813, 50-51)
Retail Trade
(52-59)
Eating and Drinking
Places (58)
Insurance Agents
(60-69)
Business Services
(47-49, 70-79)
Professional Services
(80-89)
TOTAL

[Vol. 105:2310

% restructured % sold % shut down
without plan
off
or dismissed
(sd)
(sd)
(sd)

Frequency

% reorganized
(sd)

14

21.4

0.0

0.0

78.6

12

25.0

16.67

25.0

33.3

4

0.0

25.0

0.0

75.0

3

33.3

0.0

0.0

66.7

14

28.6

14.3

14.3

42.9

19

21.5

5.3

10.5

63.2

3

0.0

0.0

0.0

100.0

18

27.8

0.0

5.6

66.7

17

17.7

11.8

0.0

70.6

104

22.1
(41.70)

7.7
(26.78)

7.7
(26.78)

62.5
(48.65)

Chapter 11 filing is unsuccessful. 54 These questions, however, are not so
easy. To be sure, a few Chapter 11 filings involve corporations in which a
focus on the corporate entity makes sense. There are businesses that exist independently of whoever happens to own them, and they are qualitatively similar to the large Chapter 11 cases that make the headlines. A
restaurant/microbrewery is sold as a going concern, 5 5 as are a chain of
Mrs. Field's cookie franchises 56 and a hotel. 5 7 A manufacturer of furnace
linings sorts out its asbestos liabilities in Chapter 11.58 But these busi59
nesses-like Chapter 11 filings involving large corporations-are rare.
54. See United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 203 (1983) ("In
proceedings under the reorganization provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, a troubled
enterprise may be restructured to enable it to operate successfully in the future ...
Congress presumed that the assets of the debtor would be more valuable if used in a
rehabilitated business than if 'sold for scrap."'); Robert L. Jordan et al., Bankruptcy 633
(5th ed. 1999) ("[S]ociety is better off also when a firm that is worth more alive than dead
is successfully rehabilitated."); Mark S. Scarberry et al., Business Reorganization in
Bankruptcy 1-2 (2d ed. 2001) ("Chapter 11 of the federal Bankruptcy Code gives
financially distressed businesses an opportunity to reorganize and avoid liquidation....
The fundamental premise of chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code is that reorganization is
desirable.").
55. In re Windy City Brewers, L.L.C., No. 98-30630 (Bankr. N.D. II. Feb. 18, 1999).
56. In re Butterwings Entm't Group, Inc., No. 98-28776 (Bankr. N.D. 111.
Dec. 14,
1999).
57. In re Am. Inn's, Inc., No. 98-29661 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Oct. 19, 1999).
58. In re M.H. Detrick Co., No. 98-1004 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Feb. 20, 2001).
59. For such a business to exist, it must, at a minimum, have brought together people
or assets in a way that cannot be replicated at little or no cost. It is for this reason that the
archetype of the business most suited for reorganization is the railroad. The assets possess
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TABLE

5:

Industrial (SIC No.)
Construction (15-17)
Manufacturing (20-39)
Transportation (40-48)
Wholesale Trade (4813, 50-51)
Retail Trade (52-59)
Eating and Drinking Places (58)
Insurance Agents (60-69)
Business Services (47-49, 70-79)
Professional Services (80-89)
TOTAL

2327

SERIAL ENTREPRENEURS AND CHAPTER 11
OUTCOMES OF REORGANIZATIONS

Business failed after
reorganizing
(frequency) (n)
(%) (sd)
1 (3)
1 (3)

Mean years until
failure after
reorganizing
(sd)
.9
4.5

0 (1)
1 (4)
1 (4)

1.8
2.5

2 (5)
3 (3)
9 (23)
(39.1) (49.90)

2.5
2.2
2.5
(1.54)

Much more common are businesses organized around the skills of
the owner-operator. The business and its owner-operator are one and
the same. The business may be a livery service, 60 a small trucking business, 6 ' or a travel 62 or insurance 63 agency. In each case, it is impossible
to separate the business from the person running it. As a result, any effort to sort out the rights and obligations of the corporation in bankruptcy has only a tangential effect on the business itself. These businesses
consist of relationships, not assets, and the relationships belong to the
individual, not the corporation. 64 If you were happy with the work pervalue only if kept together. The right-hand rails are worth little without the left-hand ones.
Our data, however, shows the absence of assets or anything else that would give the
business value as a going concern. As one of us has observed elsewhere, there are no
railroads here. Edward R. Morrison, Bankruptcy Decision-Making: An Empirical Study of
Small-Business Bankruptcies 57 (2003) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Chicago) (on file with author). Our work here ties to other scholarship suggesting that
even large financially distressed businesses lack going-concern value and the other
attributes traditionally used to justify a regime such as Chapter 11. See, e.g., Douglas G.
Baird & Robert K Rasmusssen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 751, 768-77
(2002) [hereinafter Baird & Rasmussen, End of Bankruptcy].
60. In re ABO Taxicab Ass'n Inc., No. 98-23646 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Sept. 10, 1998).
61. In re Sam's Cartage Co., No. 98-8367 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Jan. 28, 1999).
62. In re Adventura Int'l, No. 98-15986 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Nov. 12, 1998); In re Gary
Wheaton Travel, L.L.C., No. 98-5805 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. May 26, 1998).
63. In re NIS, Inc., No. 98-11271 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 18, 2000); In re Cooper &
Soble Ins. Agency, No. 98-20198 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Dec. 15, 1999).
64. If the corporation had an existence apart from the small entrepreneur, it could
force her to sign a covenant not to compete. This would, in effect, give the corporation a
sort of "ownership" over the relationships the entrepreneur established. Many states have
limitations on the enforceability of such covenants, however. See Ronald J. Gilson, The
Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128,
and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 575, 627-28 (1999). More to the point,
the entrepreneur who owns and controls the company has no reason to tie her hands this
way. In theory, a large institutional lender might insist on such covenants, but such lenders
insist that the entrepreneur bond themselves with personal guarantees, rather than with
covenants not to compete. See infra Table 17.
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formed last year and want to use the same people again, you are indifferent to the existence of the corporation. You might reengage this entrepreneur without ever knowing (or caring) that the corporate form she is
using this year is different from the one she used last year. 6 5 For such
entrepreneurs and everyone who does business with them in the future,
the bankruptcy of the corporation has virtually no effect.
Small-business entrepreneurs have a taste for running their own businesses. They start their businesses and continue to run them even
though they would earn more elsewhere, 66 and even though owning such
a business requires tying up much of their wealth-typically about
half 67-in the business. The strongest predictor of whether an individual
will open a business is whether his parents did. 66 It is not a question of
children being brought into the family business. Most of those who run
their own business run a business different from that of their parents. 69
A parent's self-employment experience has a large and statistically significant effect on a son's likelihood of becoming self-employed, even after
controlling for parental wealth and the son's wealth (and other
covariates) .70
65. The customer is indifferent because the corporate form does little more than
partition assets. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of
Organizational Law, 110 Yale L.J. 387, 390 (2000). The creditors of the corporation know
that they cannot reach the home or the personal bank account of the entrepreneur. On
the other hand, these same creditors know that if the corporation has an account
receivable, they will be able to reach it before either the entrepreneur or her personal
creditors. See id. at 390, 393-95, 397 tbl.1 ("The truly essential aspect of asset partitioning
is .. . the shielding of the assets of the entity from claims of the creditors of the entity's
owners or managers.").
66. See Barton H. Hamilton, Does Entrepreneurship Pay? An Empirical Analysis of
the Returns to Self-Employment, 108 J. Pol. Econ. 604, 622 (2000) (presenting evidence
that "individuals are willing to enter self-employment despite a stream of future returns at
least 35 percent less than that available as a paid employee").
67. William M. Gentry & R. Glenn Hubbard, Entrepreneurship and Household
Saving, Advances Econ. Analysis & Pol'y, Vol. 4: No. 1, 2004, Art. 8, 22-23, at http://
www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1053&context=bejeap
(on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
68. See Thomas Dunn & Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Financial Capital, Human Capital, and
the Transition to Self-Employment: Evidence from Intergenerational Links, 18 J. Labor
Econ. 282, 296-99 (2000) (finding from survey of young men that sons of self-employed
parents are significantly more likely to become entrepreneurs than sons of parents with no
self-employment history).
69. See id. at 290 (finding that "36% of second-generation self-employed sons would
be classified as entering a family business").
70. See id. at 296-99. A son's probability of becoming self-employed rises .015
(relative to an average probability of becoming self-employed equal to .031) when either of
his parents is self-employed. Id. at 299; see also id. at 297 tbl.6 (showing that effect is
highly statistically significant). In other words, a parent's self-employment experience
increases the son's probability of becoming self-employed by about 50%. The
phenomenon is also independent of wealth. Self-employed parents are three times
wealthier than non-self-employed parents, see id. at 292, and greater parental wealth
increases the probability that a son will become self-employed, id. at 297-98. But the effect
is modest. A $10,000 increase in parental assets raises the probability of a son's annual
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Many small businesses fail each year. Indeed, over 30% of new startups close within two years; over 50% close within four years. 71 The failure
of the business, however, does not mean that the person who ran it returns to work for someone else never to try again; many are serial entrepreneurs. The founders of 20% to 30% of all small businesses have
started other businesses in the past. 7 2 Indeed, starting a business, then
closing it, and beginning another is no more a failure than accepting one
job, then leaving it, and going to another. 73 There is an optimal amount
of time to spend at one job before looking for another. The same is true
74
for these owner-operators. Although patterns vary across industries,
one basic pattern emerges: The longer you are in business for yourself,
the less likely you are to return to working for someone else. 75 Serial
entrepreneurship is the most persistent and most telling characteristic of
small business bankruptcies. The entrepreneurs with business ventures
that end up in Chapter 11 are overwhelmingly committed to self-employtransition to self-employment by .0009. Given that the annual probability of transition is
.031, this is a very small effect. Id. at 298.
71. See, e.g., Amy E. Knaup, Survival and Longevity in the Business Employment
Dynamics Data, Monthly Lab. Rev., May 2005, at 50, 51, 52 chart 1, available at http://
www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2005/05/ressum.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review). A
recent study, using data from Columbus, Ohio, reports that about 60% of restaurants fail
within their first three years. H.G. Parsa et al., Why Restaurants Fail, 46 Cornell Hotel &
Restaurant Admin. Q. 304, 309-10 (2005).
72. Based on a review of the entrepreneurship literature, Sarasvathy and Menon
conclude that at least one-third of new firms are founded by entrepreneurs who have
started businesses before. Saras D. Sarasvathy & Anil R. Menon, Failing Firms and
Successful Entrepreneurs: Serial Entrepreneurship as a Temporal Portfolio 9 (Darden
Graduate Sch. of Bus. Admin., Working Paper No. 04-05, 2003), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=571921
(on file with the Columbia Law
Review). A smaller figure-20.6%-is reported by the U.S. Census Bureau, based on its
1992 survey of the Characteristics of Business Owners. U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1992
Economic Census: Characteristics of Business Owners 102 tbl.12a (1997), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/3/97pubs/cbo-9201.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
73. Optimaljob search is the subject of a vast literature. See, e.g., Kenneth Burdett, A
Theory of Employee Job Search and Quit Rates, 68 Am. Econ. Rev. 212 (1978);Johnson,
supra note 4; Boyan Jovanovic, Firm-Specific Capital and Turnover, 87 J. Pol. Econ. 1246
(1979); Jovanovic, Job Matching, supra note 4.
74. Most obviously, startup costs vary by industry. Manufacturing, wholesaling, and
retailing have relatively high capital intensity, including startup costs. Timothy Bates,
Analysis of Young, Small Business Firms that Have Closed: Delineating Successful from
Unsuccessful Closures, 20 J. Bus. Venturing 343, 351 (2005). Service industries, such as
professional services, finance and insurance, and real estate, are skill-intensive and have
relatively low startup costs. Id. In the construction industry, those who run their own
businesses at one time regularly switch to working for someone else and then back to
working for themselves again, depending upon the economy and the work that is available.
Id.
75. Indeed, using 1966-1981 data from the National Longitudinal Study of Young
Men, Evans and Leighton found that the probability of exiting self-employment falls
essentially to zero after eleven years. David S. Evans & Linda S. Leighton, Some Empirical
Aspects of Entrepreneurship, 79 Am. Econ. Rev. 519, 525 (1989).
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ment. Although they are not committed to any particular business, they
are committed to being in business for themselves.
Before we focus upon serial entrepreneurship explicitly, however, we
first want to show how the data do not support the traditional account of
Chapter 11. That account depends crucially on the existence of assets
tied to a particular legal entity that are worth more if kept together, or
worth more with the human capital of the entrepreneur or the relationships she has built over time. The next part of the Article turns to this
question.
II. ASSET SPECIFICITY AND GOINC-CONCERN VALUE
If the assets of a small business are worth more in the hands of the
current owner than anywhere else and if Chapter 11 can help ensure that
they stay together, then we can justify Chapter 11 on the ground that it
preserves going-concern value. 76 To the extent that the assets of a distressed business are specialized and more valuable inside the business
than outside it, Chapter 11 might prevent the dispersal of a business's
assets when the best use of those assets is in that business. This Part
shows, however, that Chapter 11 does not in fact serve this function. The
typical, distressed small business in Chapter 11 has little in the way of
business-specific capital.
In the first subpart, we analyze the raw data for all of the businesses
in our sample and offer two different tests of asset specificity. Both point
to its absence in all cases but one, restaurants. The second subpart illustrates this point with a case study of a typical nonrestaurant establishment. The concluding subpart looks at restaurants, the only type of case
where asset specificity is potentially important.
A. Two Empirical Tests of Asset Specificity
A policy directed towards saving businesses makes sense only if social
value is lost when a business dies. Social value is lost if the assets generate
greater value in their current configuration than in a market sale. This
difference-the "going-concern surplus"-exists only if the assets are
worth more inside the business than anywhere else. 7 7 Assets are sometimes customized to meet a business's idiosyncratic needs or the needs of
businesses in the same industry; examples include railroad tracks and
brewery equipment. These specialized assets cannot be readily
76. See infra Part II.A.
77. For similar arguments, see, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Robert K Rasmussen,
Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 673, 685-93 (2003) [hereinafter Baird &
Rasmussen, Twilight] (discussing impact of fungible assets and business relationships on
going-concern value); Baird & Rasmussen, End of Bankruptcy, supra note 59, at 768-77;
Viral V. Acharya et al., On the Capital Structure Implications of Bankruptcy Codes 3-4
(June 2, 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=548523 (discussing effects of asset
specificity on firm liquidation values).
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redeployed by other businesses if the assets are business specific or by
businesses outside the industry if they are industry specific. As a result,
78
plant, equipment, and other specialized assets are relatively illiquid.
There are few buyers for the assets, and any potential buyers will value the
assets significantly less than the seller does.7 9 A basic function of bankruptcy law is to protect these illiquid assets and give the business the
chance to continue using them. If creditors seized and sold these assets,
they would fetch only "fire-sale" prices, and the business's going-concern
surplus would be destroyed. 80
The liquidation of a corporation is often viewed as irreversible.8 1
Even if it were possible to resurrect the business by reacquiring or recreating its specialized assets, it is costly to do so. Asset specificity, then, is
central to traditional theories of Chapter 11. In the absence of businessspecific or industry-specific assets, a business is not worth reorganizing.
Because an outsider values the assets at least as much as they are worth
inside the existing business, no value is lost if the business is liquidated.
Indeed, liquidation in this case avoids the direct and indirect costs of
Chapter 11.82
Even a casual glance at the data suggests that Chapter 11 has little to
do with preserving the value of small businesses as going concerns.8 3 The
bulk of small businesses in bankruptcy-the contractors, the livery services, the retailers-are organized around the skills of the entrepreneur.
The physical capital of these businesses consists of generic tools and
equipment. The only significant asset is the human capital of the entre78. Phillip G. Berger et al., Investor Valuation of the Abandonment Option, 42J. Fin.
Econ. 257, 261-62 (1996).
79. See, e.g., Oliver E. Williamson, Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance, 43
J. Fin. 567, 579-81 (1988) (showing that this effect raises cost of debt financing).
80. See generally Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Liquidation Values and Debt
Capacity: A Market Equilibrium Approach, 47J. Fin. 1343 (1992). The authors show that
when financial distress is correlated within an industry, bankruptcy law prevents inefficient
liquidation of industry-specific assets. In the absence of bankruptcy law, these assets would
be sold at fire-sale prices to lower-value users outside the industry; the assets will not be
purchased by higher-valuing users within the same industry because they too are suffering
distress and are therefore liquidity constrained. For empirical evidence supporting this
theory, see Todd C. Pulvino, Do Asset Fire Sales Exist? An Empirical Investigation of
Commercial Aircraft Sale Transactions, 53 J. Fin. 939, 966-68 (1998); Per Str6mberg,
Conflicts of Interest and Market Illiquidity in Bankruptcy Auctions: Theory and Tests, 55 J.
Fin. 2641, 2669, 2675, 2679 (2000).
81. This is implicit in the notion that Chapter 11 is needed to preserve going-concern
value. See supra note 54. If liquidation is reversible, it is little or no threat to goingconcern value. See, e.g., White, supra note 11, at 273 (presenting model in which firms are
unlikely to reopen after shutdown).
82. For recent work on these costs, see Bris et al., supra note 33, at 8-23. Again, we
are focusing on the typical bankruptcy case, not the handful of cases involving tens of
millions of dollars or more in assets. One can argue that asset specificity does not matter
in large cases either. See, e.g., Baird & Rasmussen, End of Bankruptcy, supra note 59, at
768-77. But that is not our focus here.
83. See supra Table 4.
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84
Simipreneur, and it can be readily deployed in different businesses.
larly, the relationships with suppliers, customers, and workers are tied to
the entrepreneur, not to the business. However valuable they are, they
are not at risk if the corporate entity ceases to exist. Absent serious liquidity constraints, the photographer, electrician, lawyer, and restaurateur can shut down one operation and open another and be just as productive. In this Part, we confirm this impression with two empirical tests.

1. A Direct Test of Asset Specificity. - We begin with the standard test
of asset specificity used in corporate finance literature.8 5 We measure the
extent to which a business has invested in relatively illiquid assets, such as
plant and equipment. The value of plant and equipment-and perhaps
other specialized assets-is divided by total assets to form an index of
asset specificity. The larger this index, the greater the importance of specialized assets in a given business. This test is, of course, imperfect. It
does not account for the possibility that some assets, like office furniture,
may be customized in the case of some businesses but not others. Nonetheless, the direct test is illuminating and the results striking.
TABLE

6: MEASURES Or

ASSET SPECIFICITY FOR MEDIAN BUSINESS,

CORPORATE CHAPTER 1 1 FILINGS

Land &
equipment
(% of assets)

Equipment
(% of assets)

Nonoffice
equipment
(% of assets)

Construction (15-17)
Manufacturing (20-39)
Transportation (40-46)
Wholesale Trade (4813, 50-51)

12.1
16.1
1.1
3.1

10.0
8.2
1.1
3.1

7.8
4.9
0.0
0.0

Retail Trade (52-59)

16.3

13.7

1.3

Eating and Drinking Places (58)

62.0

57.4

50.9

Insurance Agents (60-64)

22.1

22.1

0.0

Business Services (47, 4959, 70-79)

78.7

59.5

6.9

Professional Services (80-89)

16.2

7.6

0.0

ALL BUSINESSES

28.9

16.5

5.5

ALL BUSINESSES ExcEPr EANrG/DRINK1NG

17.1

10.6

2.2

Industry (SIC No.)

84. See infra Part II.A.2.
85. See, e.g., Berger et al., supra note 78, at 261-62, 268-69 (characterizing assets by
degree of specificity and computing specificity indices); Stromberg, supra note 80, at 2664
(same).
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TABLE

7:

ASSET SPECIFICITY OF MEDIAN BUSINESS,
CORPORATIONS

Industry (SIC No.)
Construction (15-17)
Manufacturing (20-39)
Transportation (40-46, 48-49)
Wholesale Trade (50-51)
Retail Trade (52-57, 59)
Eating and Drinking Places (58)
Insurance Agents (60-64)
Business Services (47, 4959, 70-79)
Professional Services (80-89)
TOTAL
TOTAL WITHOUT EATING/DRINKING

TABLE 8:

1998 SSBF

DATA FOR

(UNWEIGHTED)

Land & equipment
(% of assets)
18.9
29.9
41.5
11.0
13.7
65.4
18.2
24.8
21.1
21.8
20.2

Equipment
(% of assets)
17.0
29.6
38.3
9.8
11.8
47.7
18.2
21.0
10.9
19.0
17.9

MEASURES

OF ASSET SPECIFICITY FOR MEAN BUSINESS,
CORPORATE CHAPTER 11 FILINGS

Industry (SIC No.)
Construction (15-17)
Manufacturing (20-39)
Transportation (40-46)
Wholesale Trade (4813, 50-51)
Retail Trade (52-59)
Eating and Drinking Places (58)
Insurance Agents (60-64)
Business Services (47, 4959, 70-79)
Professional Services (80-89)
ALL BUSINESSES
ALL BUSINESSES EXCEPT EATING/DRINKING

Land &
equipment
(% of assets)
(sd)
21.4 (28.08)
33.6 (39.48)
1.1 (1.51)
3.7 (4.07)
25.9 (27.10)
61.3 (27.12)
18.3 (11.98)
65.7 (34.91)
40.9 (40.85)
40.6 (36.45)
35.8 (36.79)

Equipment
(% of assets)
(sd)
19.7 (28.51)
25.2 (35.10)
1.1 (1.51)
3.7 (4.07)
18.7 (16.95)
55.8 (28.94)
18.3 (11.98)
54.2 (38.10)
20.1 (30.74)
31.9 (33.60)
26.4 (32.31)

Nonoffice
equipment
(% of assets)
(sd)
15.7 (25.35)
22.1 (30.12)

0.0 (0.00)
0.6
9.4
53.9
3.1
34.4
5.1
22.9
15.8

(1.16)
(14.17)
(28.26)
(5.37)
(39.87)
(14.75)
(31.04)
(27.16)

TABLE 9: ASSET SPECIFICITY OF MEAN BUSINESS, 1998 SSBF DATA FOR
CORPORATIONS

(WEIGHTED)
Land & equipment
(% of assets) (sd)

Industry (SIC No.)
Construction (15-17)
Manufacturing (20-39)
Transportation (40-46, 48-49)
Wholesale Trade (50-51)
Retail Trade (52-57, 59)
Eating and Drinking Places (58)
Insurance Agents (60-64)
Business Services (47, 70-79)
Professional Services (80-89)
TOTAL
TOTAL WITHOUT EATING/DRINKING

28.2
34.2
41.1
17.9
23.1
57.6
27.0
34.3
31.0
31.25
29.7

(26.49)
(26.46)
(34.38)
(21.48)
(24.38)
(33.59)
(30.19)
(32.96)
(31.02)
(30.07)
(29.11)

Equipment
(% of assets) (sd)
25.0
32.8
39.4
15.6
19.4
47.2
25.6
30.6
28.7
28.1
26.9

(25.11)
(25.75)
(33.94)
(18.65)
(20.95)
(31.37)
(29.35)
(30.26)
(29.07)
(27.84)
(27.20)

Tables 6 through 9 present the results of this direct test. Tables 6
and 8 present various indices of asset specificity for the median and mean
business. The broadest definition of specialized assets would include
land (real estate used for a gas station, for example, is costly to convert to
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other purposes) and equipment. Using this definition, about 29% of the
median business's assets are "specialized." This definition is overbroad.
Land is rarely specialized; indeed, economists typically lump real estate
together with other nonspecialized assets such as cash. 8 6 Additionally,
the "equipment" of a small business includes computers, chairs, desks,
and other office equipment, none of which is specialized in any meaningful sense. The columns in Tables 6 and 8 show the effect of excluding
these assets from the definition of "specialized" assets. Excluding land,
the percentage drops to 16.5% for the median business. The estimates of
asset specificity in our sample drop even further when we exclude office
equipment. For the median business, the percentage drops to 5.5%. The
means are larger under all these measures (40.6%, 31.9%, and 22.9%
respectively).
But even these numbers are upper bounds for the vast majority of
businesses. They are heavily influenced by the presence of establishments in the eating and drinking (in which 50.9% of the assets of the
median business consist of nonoffice equipment), construction (7.8%),
and business services (6.9%) sectors, as the final columns of Tables 6 and
8 illustrate. Exclude eating and drinking and the estimates fall to 2.2%
for the median business and 15.8% for the mean business. If we also
exclude construction and business services, the figures fall to 0.1% and
9.8% respectively.
Eating and drinking establishments have specialized assets (an issue
we confront below), but construction and business services often do not.
The estimates for these two sectors overstate the extent of business-specific capital in excavators, drywallers, photographers, graphic designers,
and similar establishments. The nonoffice equipment of the typical construction business consists of forklifts, hammers, excavation equipment,
and other tools. Not only do these tools have thick resale markets, but
many businesses lease the equipment from third parties.8 7 If an otherwise healthy business lost this equipment through theft or fire, it could
buy or lease the equipment and continue, perhaps without even a break
in operations.8 8 The same is true for business services, as we can see from
one of the cases in our dataset. Advance Photo & Video Imagery was a
photo processing shop that owned $45,000 worth of photo developing
86. See, e.g., Berger et al., supra note 78, at 268-69 (characterizing land as lessspecialized fixed asset); Str6mberg, supra note 80, at 2664 (characterizing land as
"nonspecific asset").
87. Thick resale and leasing markets are hallmarks of low asset specificity (at the firm
level); they show vividly that construction equipment has significant value in many
different firms. These markets have become even more liquid because of the Internet.
Online services include Heavy Equipment Sales, at http://www.heavy-equipment-sales.com
(last visited Aug. 12, 2005), and American Contractors, at http://www.american
contractors.com (last visited Aug. 12, 2005).
88. For a sense of the variety of the services readily available (including daily rental of
equipment), see NES Rentals, at http://www.nesrentals.com (last visited Aug. 16, 2005).
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equipment (cameras, flash meters, film processors, and computers) .89
This accounted for 92% of its assets. Indeed, among business services in
our sample, Advance Photo had the highest ratio of nonoffice equipment
to total assets. Yet this equipment was not specialized. 90 Indeed, it represented only about half of the photo developing equipment used at the
business and was not different in kind from the remaining equipment,
and this remaining equipment was leased, a hallmark of low asset specificity. 9 What we see at Advance Photo we find elsewhere as well. When we
look closely at each business with a high fraction of assets invested in
equipment, we find, in the main, fungible, standardized assets.
Our estimates of asset specificity, then, are biased upward by the
presence of a few businesses (such as Advance Photo) with high ratios of
standardized nonoffice equipment to total assets. This bias has its largest
effect on our estimates for the mean business; means are sensitive to outliers. For this reason, the estimates for the median business-which are
less vulnerable to outliers-are more reliable estimates of the significance
of asset specificity in all businesses except restaurants. By this measure,
the typical business has 2.2% of its assets invested in specialized equipment. In other words, the typical small business has a small, perhaps trivial, investment in specialized assets. Only restaurants present something
of a special case, and, as we shall see, 9 2 the case for specialized assets with
significant value is hard to make even there.
Interestingly, the picture is not much different when we look at
healthier businesses in the SSBF sample.9 3 As Table 7 shows, about 22%
of the median business's assets consist of land and equipment, which is
slightly lower than the 29% figure in our sample. The difference narrows
substantially if we exclude restaurants: The median business in the general population has about 20% of its assets invested in land and equipment; the figure is about 17% in our sample. Similarly, equipment makes
up 17.9% of the median SSBF business's assets (excluding restaurants);
89. Schedule B at 2, In re Advance Photo & Video Imagery, Inc., No. 98-27435
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. Sept. 1, 1998).
90. Motion of Pinnacle Bank for Modification of Automatic Stay at Exhibit D, In re
Advance Photo, No. 98-27435 (showing that debtor's equipment included camera, flash unit
and meter, camera bag, tape recorders, video editor/mixer, and densitometers).
91. Debtor leased an enlarger, photo processor, monitor, recorder, mixer, printer,
workstation, and other equipment worth over $160,000. See Proof of Claim Filed by First
Sierra Financial, Inc., Exhibit A at 1-2, In re Advance Photo, No. 98-27435; Proof of Claim
Filed byJLA Credit Corp. at 1, In re Advance Photo, No. 98-27435; Proof of Claim Filed by
M&C Leasing Co., Schedule A at 1, In re Advance Photo, No. 98-27435; see also Schedule D
at 1, In re Advance Photo & Video Imagery, Inc., No. 98-15534 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. May 19,
1998) (stating debtor estimated value of leased equipment in prior Chapter 11 filing).
92. See infra Part II.C.
93. Publicly traded businesses have significantly more in the way of specialized assets.
In their study of publicly traded businesses, Berger et al. found a median of 31.9% of assets
invested in plant and equipment. Berger et al., supra note 78, at 269 tbl.1 (reporting that
"fixed assets" (plant, equipment, and land) account for 33.6% of assets in median business
and that land accounts for 5.2% of "fixed assets").
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the figure for businesses in our population is about 11%. SSBF data do
not allow us to distinguish between office equipment and nonoffice
equipment. These results, however, suggest that the low levels of asset
specificity observed in our data are not unique to distressed small
businesses.
2. An Indirect Test of Asset Specificity. - Tables 6 through 9 present a
direct test of asset specificity that distinguishes between assets with highly
liquid markets (cash) and those with less liquid markets (machinery).
This simple test suffers many limitations. It does not identify businesses
with assets that are sufficiently illiquid that they would generate "fire-sale"
prices. It can only indicate whether some firms have more specialized
assets than others. More importantly, the test can easily mischaracterize
the specificity of particular assets. Land is nonspecialized in some cases,
such as a vacant tract in an industrial park, and specialized in others, such
as land in which a petroleum storage tank has been installed. Yet the test
characterizes all land as either specialized or nonspecialized. Even office
equipment can be specialized to serve the needs of a particular firm. It
may, for example, be modified to serve the physical needs of the owneroperator.
The limitations of the direct test suggest that we look for an alternative test of the importance of business-specific or industry-specific assets.
Instead of asking whether specialized assets are present in distressed businesses, as the direct test does, we propose asking whether liquidation of
assets-specialized or nonspecialized-is an irreversible event. If a business's going-concern value depends on specialized assets that are hard to
recreate or reacquire after they have been sold off, liquidation should be
irreversible or very costly to reverse. If we observe the opposite-that the
owner-operator routinely recreates her businesses-we can conclude either that the business did not depend on specialized assets, or that, if it
did depend on them, the owner-operator was able to reacquire the assets.
For example, she may have been the high bidder at the liquidation auction. Either conclusion seriously undermines the conventional case for
Chapter 11. In the absence of specialized assets, there is no going-concern surplus to preserve or fire sale to avoid. If specialized assets are easily reacquired after liquidation, Chapter 11 is equally irrelevant because
owner-operators can preserve going-concern surplus without the law's
help. By testing whether liquidation is irreversible, then, we look for the
consequences of asset specificity. This "indirect" test complements the "direct" test of the previous subpart, which assesses the presence of asset specificity through a simple but imperfect categorization of assets.
We implement the indirect test by looking at the career histories of
the owner-operators of businesses that filed Chapter 11 petitions. If
owner-operators are able to establish new, similar businesses soon after
their businesses are liquidated in Chapter 11, we infer that business-specific assets are relatively unimportant or easy to reacquire. In either case,
there is little support for the efficiency-based theory of Chapter 11. Simi-
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larly, if the business in bankruptcy is one of many similar businesses established in the past by the owner-operator, we also infer that asset specificity
is unimportant. We must also consider the possibility that the owner-operator will start a different kind of business after her business is liquidated
in Chapter 11, and the possibility that she established different businesses
in the past. Indeed, the literature on small-business entrepreneurs indicates that they may move between different kinds of businesses as they
search for an optimal "match." 94 If we see this kind of "business shopping," we can at least conclude that the owner-operator's human capital
is not tied to the entity that is in Chapter 11.
Tables 10 through 13 report the results of this indirect test. Table 10
shows that, among businesses that were liquidated in bankruptcy ("shutdowns"), the owner-operator had founded a similar business before or
went on to found a similar business in the future in nearly 80% of the
cases. The percentage rises to 85% if we count any business founded by
the owner-operator, regardless of its similarity to the business in our
95
sample.
TABLE 10: WHETHER OWNER-OPERATOR STARTED A SIMILAR OR
DISSIMILAR BUSINESS BEFORE OR AFTER THE CHAPTER 11 CASE

Started Similar Business
% (n) (sd)

Started Dissimilar
Business
% (n) (sd)

Started Any Business
% (n) (sd)

Shutdowns

Other Cases

Shutdowns

Other Cases

Shutdowns

Other Cases

Construction (15-17)

77.8 (9)

20.0 (5)

66.7 (9)

20.0 (5)

88.9 (9)

40.0 (5)

Manufacturing (20-39)

75.0 (4)

50.0 (8)

25.0 (4)

50.0 (8)

100.0 (4)

62.5 (8)

Transportation

100.0 (2)

100.0 (2)

0.0 (2)

0.0 (2)

100.0 (2)

100.0 (2)

50.0 (2)

100.0 (1)

0.0 (2)

0.0 (1)

50.0 (2)

100.0 (1)

Retail Trade (52-59)

100.0 (3)

63.6 (11)

66.7 (3)

36.4 (11)

100.0 (3)

81.8 (11)

Eating/Drinking Places
(58)

57.1 (7)

66.7 (12)

14.3 (7)

25.0 (12)

71.4 (7)

83.3 (12)

Insurance Agents
(60-69)

50.0 (2)

100.0 (1)

0.0 (2)

0.0 (1)

50.0 (2)

100.0 (1)

Business Services
(47-49, 70-79)

83.3 (6)

33.3 (12)

50.0 (6)

8.3 (12)

83.3 (6)

41.7 (12)

Professional Services
(80-89)

100.0 (5)

83.3 (12)

0.0 (5)

41.7(12)

100.0 (5)

83.3 (12)

77.5
(40)

59.4
(64)

32.5
(40)

28.13
(64)

85.0
(40)

70.3
(64)

(42.29)

(49.50)

(47.43)

(45.32)

(36.16)

(46.05)

Industry (SIC No.)

(40-48)

Wholesale Trade
(4813, 50-51)

TOTAL

94. See, e.g., Holmes & Schmitz, Turnover, supra note 3, at 1006-07 (using a
matching model to explain various empirical regularities characterizing small businesses).
95. These estimates, it should be noted, are lower bounds because they are based
solely on data contained in records maintained by the Secretary of State of Illinois. We
have not searched the records of other states to determine whether the entrepreneurs in
our sample ever established out-of-state businesses.
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The next three tables decompose the business experience of owneroperators. Table 11 focuses on their experience prior to the Chapter 11
filing in our sample. It shows that between 45% and 47% of all owneroperators had founded at least one business that failed before they filed
the cases in our sample. There is little difference between owner-operators whose Chapter 11 filings led to shutdown ("failures") and those
whose businesses survived the bankruptcy process ("successes"). Owners
of failures were just as likely as owners of successes to have founded a
similar (37.5% and 35.9%, respectively) or dissimilar (15.0% and 17.2%)
business that failed in the past.
TABLE 11:

WHETHER OWNER-OPERATOR STARTED A SIMILAR OR

DISSIMILAR BUSINESS THAT FAILED BEFORE THE CHAPTER 11 CASE

Industry (SIC No.)

Started Similar Business
% (n) (sd)
Shutdowns Other Cases

Started Dissimilar
Business
% (n) (sd)
Shutdowns Other Cases

Started Any Business
% (n) (sd)
Shutdowns Other Cases

Construction (15-17)

33.3 (9)

0.0 (5)

33.3 (9)

20.0 (5)

44.0 (9)

20.0 (5)

Manufacturing (20-39)

0.0 (4)

12.5 (8)

25.0 (4)

25.0 (8)

25.0 (4)

37.5 (8)

Transportation
(40-48)

0.0 (2)

50.0 (2)

0.0 (2)

0.0 (2)

0.0 (2)

50.0 (2)

Wholesale Trade
(4813,50-51)

0.0 (2)

100.0 (1)

0.0 (2)

0.0 (1)

0.0 (2)

100.0 (1)

Retail Trade (52-59)

100.0 (3)

27.2 (11)

0.0 (3)

18.2 (11)

100.0 (3)

36.4 (11)

Eating/Drinking Places
(58)

42.9 (7)

50.0 (12)

14.3 (7)

16.7 (12)

57.1 (7)

66.7 (12)

Insurance Agents
(60-69)

50.0 (2)

100.0 (1)

0.0 (2)

0.0 (1)

50.0 (2)

100.0 (1)

Business Services
(47-49, 70-79)

33.3 (6)

16.7 (12)

16.7 (6)

8.3 (12)

33.3 (6)

25.0 (12)

Professional Services
(80-89)

60.0 (5)

66.7 (12)

0.0 (5)

25.0 (12)

60.0 (5)

66.7 (12)

37.5
(40)
(49.03)

35.9
(64)
(48.36)

15.0
(40)
(36.16)

17.2
(64)
(38.03)

45.0
(40)
(50.38)

46.9
(64)
(50.30)

TOTAL

Table 12 looks at the postbankruptcy experience of owner-operators.
Among businesses that were shut down in bankruptcy, the owner-operators went on to found another business in 50% of the cases. In about
38% of the cases, the new business was similar to the one that was liquidated in bankruptcy. The percentages are, not surprisingly, much lower
for owner-operators whose businesses survived the bankruptcy process.
An owner-operator surely has less incentive to establish a new business if
his or her existing business continues.
Table 12, however, underestimates the frequency with which owneroperators start over again when their businesses fail. Many small entrepreneurs run multiple businesses simultaneously. Instead of increasing
the size of the legal entity when opening a new outlet, the small entrepreneur may put the new operation into an entirely separate corporation.
Or the entrepreneur may diversify her business portfolio and establish a
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completely different business, again in a new and freestanding corporation. As with any diversification strategy, by owning multiple businesses,
an entrepreneur effectively avoids the costs of starting over again when
any one business fails; the death of any one business does not disrupt the
others.

12:

TABLE

WHETHER OWNER-OPERATOR STARTED A SIMILAR OR

DISSIMILAR BUSINESS AFTER THE CHAPTER
Started Similar Business
% (n) (sd)
Industry (SIC No.)

Shutdowns

Other Cases

Started Dissimilar
Business
% (n) (sd)

1I CASE
Started Any Business
% (n) (sd)

Shutdowns

Other Cases

Shutdowns

Other Cases

44.4 (9)

20.0 (5)

Construction (15-17)

33.3 (9)

20.0 (5)

11.1 (9)

0.0 (5)

Manufacturing (20-39)

75.0 (4)

12.5 (8)

25.0 (4)

12.5 (8)

100.0 (4)

25.0 (8)

Transportation
(40-48)

100.0 (2)

50.0 (2)

0.0 (2)

0.0 (2)

100.0 (2)

50.0 (2)

Wholesale Trade
(4813, 50-51)

50.0 (2)

0.0 (1)

0.0 (2)

0.0 (1)

50.0 (2)

0.0 (1)

0.0 (3)

27.3 (11)

66.7 (3)

27.3 (11)

66.7 (3)

54.6 (11)

Eating/Drinking Places
(58)

14.29 (7)

33.3 (12)

0.0 (7)

8.3 (12)

14.3 (7)

41.7 (12)

Insurance Agents
(60-69)

50.0 (2)

100.0 (1)

0.0 (2)

0.0 (1)

50.0 (2)

100.0 (1)

Business Services
(47-49, 70-79)

33.3 (6)

8.3 (12)

33.3 (6)

0.0 (13)

50.0 (6)

8.3 (13)

Professional Services
(80-89)

40.0 (5)

41.7 (12)

0.0 (5)

16.7 (12)

40.0 (5)

50.0 (12)

TOTAL

37.5
(40)
(49.03)

26.6
(64)
(44.52)

15.0
(40)
(36.16)

10.9
(65)
(31.46)

50.0
(40)
(50.64)

35.9
(65)
(48.36)

Retail Trade (52-59)

Table 13 takes account of an entrepreneur's ability to "start over"
either by founding a new business or by continuing other businesses
when one fails. Owner-operators whose businesses were liquidated in
bankruptcy started a new business or continued others in 70% of the
cases. In 60% of the cases, the new or continued businesses were similar
to the one shut down in Chapter 11.
In short, 85% of the owner-operators in our sample are serial entrepreneurs. For those whose businesses were shut down in bankruptcy, this
legal outcome was a nonevent: Seventy percent of them moved on to
other businesses. The only effect of Chapter 11 was to delay the time
when they moved on. Those who use Chapter 11, then, are dedicated
serial entrepreneurs. They start new businesses at a rate much higher
than the general population. A panel study of young men, for example,
found that the probability of self-employment over a fifteen-year period
was only 18% generally and 32% among sons of fathers who were once
self-employed. 9 6 But our findings are unsurprising given what we know
about those who run their own businesses. The median business in our
96. Dunn & Holtz-Eakin, supra note 68, at 286-89.
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RUNNING A SIMILAR OR

DIssIMIlLAR BUSINESS

Started or Continued
Running Similar Business
% (n) (sd)
Industry (SIC No.)
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AFTER THE CHAPTER 11 CASE

Started or Continued
Running Dissimilar
Business
% (n) (sd)

Started or Continued
Running Any Business
% (n) (sd)

Shutdowns

Other Cases

Shutdowns

Other Cases

Shutdowns

Other Cases

Construction (15-17)

55.6 (9)

20.0 (5)

44.4 (9)

0.0 (5)

66.7 (9)

20.0 (5)

Manufacturing (20-39)

75.0 (4)

37.5 (8)

25.0 (4)

37.5 (8)

100.0 (4)

62.5 (8)

Transportation
(40-48)

100.0 (2)

100.0 (2)

0.0 (2)

0.0 (2)

100.0 (2)

100.0 (2)

Wholesale Trade
(4813, 50-51)

50.0 (2)

0.0 (1)

0.0 (2)

0.0 (1)

50.0 (2)

0.0 (1)

Retail Trade (52-59)

0.0 (3)

45.5 (11)

66.7 (3)

27.3 (11)

66.7 (3)

63.6 (11)

Eating/Drinking Places
(58)

57.1 (7)

41.7 (12)

0.0 (7)

25.0 (12)

57.1 (7)

66.7 (12)

Insurance Agents
(60-69)

50.0 (2)

100.0 (1)

0.0 (2)

0.0 (1)

50.0 (2)

100.0 (1)

Business Services
(47-49, 70-79)

66.7 (6)

16.7 (12)

33.3 (6)

0.0 (13)

66.7 (6)

16.7 (13)

Professional Services
(80-89)

80.0 (5)

50.0 (12)

0.0 (5)

16.7 (12)

80.0 (5)

58.3 (12)

TOTAL

60.0
(40)
(49.61)

39.1
(64)
(49.17)

22.5
(40)
(42.29)

17.2
(64)
(38.03)

70.0
(40)
(46.41)

51.6
(64)
(50.37)

sample was about seven years old, as Table 2 showed, and about 40% of
the entrepreneurs had founded businesses that failed before they filed
the Chapter 11 petitions in our sample. Thus, a large fraction of the
small-business owners in our sample had well over seven years of experience in self-employment. Previous empirical work has shown that, for
entrepreneurs with this much experience, the probability of exiting self97
employment is very low.
These results reinforce the view that small businesses in bankruptcy
possess little in the way of assets whose value depends upon their being
kept together. Owner-operators face little or no difficulty in starting over
again, taking their human capital and all the relationships they have established in their old business with them. Whatever benefit owner-operators enjoy from the Chapter 11 process (such as a reduction in their personal liability for the IRS obligations of the business), the outcome of a
Chapter 11 proceeding-reorganization or liquidation-is largely irrelevant to what they do in the future. The drywall contractor will continue
to hang drywall; the stand-alone travel agent will remain a stand-alone
travel agent. Their customers will continue to use them (or not) independent of the legal entity in which they choose to operate.

97. In fact, the probability is zero among entrepreneurs with at least eleven years of
experience. See Evans & Leighton, supra note 75, at 525.
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B. A Case Study of Asset Specificity
Nieman Industries was a maker of molded plastics for automobile,
98
consumer products, computer, and electronic parts supply industries.
It was the first corporation to file a Chapter 11 petition in the Northern
District of Illinois in 1998. 99 Nieman Industries might seem an example
of an unsuccessful Chapter 11. No disclosure statement was ever filed
and the petition was dismissed without a plan of reorganization being
proposed, let alone confirmed.10 0 At the end, the business had been
stripped of all of its assets. 1° 1 It might seem as if the entrepreneur would
now have to turn elsewhere for his livelihood. He would no longer be
able to run his own business in this industry. It turns out that, as in so
many cases in our sample, this is emphatically not the case.
Like the vast majority of small corporations in Chapter 11, there was
no going-concern value. Nieman Industries, the corporation, was a collection of entirely fungible equipment 0 2 set up inside a nondescript
building in an industrial park.1 03 It could be reassembled in almost no
time at small cost. The equipment, while expensive, had no special value
in this corporation as opposed to another that makes plastic parts. 10 4 In98. Voluntary Petition, Amended Exhibit A at 1, In re Nieman Indus., Inc., No. 9800356 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 5, 1998).
99. This can be verified using the "Cases Report" feature available on the Northern
District's PACER website, at https://ecf.ilnb.uscourts.gov/index.html (last visited Oct. 1,
2005) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
100. Order Dismissing Chapter 11 at 1, In re Nieman, No. 98-00356.
101. Illinois records indicate that Nieman Industries underwent "voluntary
dissolution" on April 8, 1998. See Illinois Secretary of State Public Records, available at
LEXIS, ILREC Database (on file with the Columbia Law Review). When the case was
dismissed, leased equipment was returned to lessors and collateral was turned over to
secured lenders. Telephone Interview with Richard Nieman, Vice President, Treasurer, &
Dir., Nieman Industries (Sept. 25, 2002) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
102. The bulk of the debtor's assets consisted of two injection-molding machines and
a forklift. These assets were leased, a hallmark of fungibility. See Schedule G-Executory
Contracts and Unexpired Leases, In re Nieman, No. 98-00356 (listing leased equipment and
vehicle); see also Motion to Compel Debtor to Assume or Reject Truck Lease, Exhibit B at
B-7, In re Nieman, No. 98-00356 (setting out schedule of payments for leased equipment).
The undiscounted sum of payments equals about $310,000; at a discount rate of 10%, the
payments have a present value of about $236,000, far more than the value of any
equipment that the debtor actually owned. The schedules indicate that the debtor owned
some equipment of "[u]nknown" value, but it was certainly worth no more than the
purchase money security interest (worth about $78,000) encumbering it. See Schedule B
at 3, In re Nieman, No. 98-00356; Schedule D, In re Nieman, No. 98-00356.
103. Nieman Industries was located in Bensenville, home to the sixth largest
industrial park in Illinois. See DuPage County Dep't of Econ. Dev., Village of Bensenville,
at http://www.co.dupage.il.us/economicdevelopment/municipalities.cfm?doc-id=29 (last
visited Oct. 18, 2005) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
104. To the extent that equipment for making plastic parts requires customized dyes,
these would belong not to Nieman, but to Nieman's downstream customers. The idea that
specialized equipment can be used in arms-length transactions in the market instead of
being located within a particular business is one of the foundational ideas of industrial
organization. Indeed, Nieman's business (a supplier of parts to, among others, auto
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deed, Nieman leased the equipment it used to manufacture its plastic
parts. 10 5 By the time of the Chapter 11, the most valuable asset in the
enterprise was the owner-operator's set of relationships with various customers. Scott Nieman founded the business with help from his father' 0 6
(who ran his own plastic-molding business 10 7) several years before, but
his human capital was not business-specific. Scott had industry-specific
human capital, and the challenge was one of creating a business that best
matched this human capital. This asset did not belong to the corporation. The creditors of the corporation had no right to Scott's human
capital. This human capital-industry-specific, but not business-specific-would exist regardless of whether the corporation continued, and
the Chapter 11 process had no effect on it.
Little is to be gained from keeping a business such as Nieman Industries alive. In other words, the stakes in this case had nothing to do with
the corporation, but everything to do with Scott and his specialized
human capital. Nothing prevented him from walking away from the corporation, free either to start another business or to work for someone
else. Indeed, those in Scott's position are often serial entrepreneurs.
Scott's father was the owner-operator of a different business in the same
industry. This alone makes Scott about three times more likely than the
average person to run his own business.1 0 8 By upbringing and temperament, those in his position are willing to incur substantial costs and
forego higher income elsewhere to run their own businesses. He is likely
to keep starting businesses until he finds one that provides the best match
with his human capital.
It would be a mistake for the policies governing the reorganization
of Nieman Industries to distort Scott's career choices-whether to continue with the current business, start a new one, or work for someone
else. Yet Chapter 11 as written allows judges to do exactly this. It can be
interpreted in a way that induces Scott to tie his human capital to Nieman
Industries, Inc., regardless of whether it makes sense. The automatic stay
and other bankruptcy rules provide a chance to divert assets from lessors,
landlords, and general creditors that make keeping this business afloat
relatively more attractive than starting another. 10 9
manufacturers) is the iconic example of such relationships. Coase was, of course, the first
to understand this. See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica 386, 388 (1937);
see also R.H. Coase, The Acquisition of Fisher Body by General Motors, 43J.L. & Econ. 15,
21-27 (2000).
105. See supra note 102.
106. His father was Vice President, Treasurer, Director, and owner of 41.7% of the
corporation's stock. Statement of Financial Affairs at 6, In re Nieman, No. 98-00356.
107. His business, "The Mold Shop," was founded in 1984 and is ongoing, according
to Illinois records. See Illinois Secretary of State Public Records, available at LEXIS,
ILREC Database (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
108. See Dunn & Holtz-Eakin, supra note 68, at 289.
109. In this case, Chapter 11 could have provided two sorts of distortions. First, it may
have allowed Scott to keep the leased equipment and pay something less than he would
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If given the chance to take advantage of Chapter 11 in this manner,
Scott would be acting rationally, just as those who remain in a rent-controlled apartment that is too small or too far from work are acting rationally. Moreover, such interpretations of Chapter 11 make it more likely at
the margin that someone in Scott's position will remain self-employed
and not work for anyone else. 110 But there is an economic distortion
nevertheless. While it might be a good thing to encourage entrepreneurs
like Scott to remain entrepreneurs, it is generally a bad idea to encourage
them in a way that biases them towards keeping specific business ventures
like Nieman Industries alive.
There might be businesses that look on the surface like Nieman Industries but fit the profile of the traditional candidate for a corporate
reorganization."' The equipment might have been specialized. A large
group of creditors might have been closing in on the assets. The speed of
the nonbankruptcy debt-collection process and an inability to renegotiate
with everyone simultaneously might lead to a premature dismantling of
the business. Chapter 11 might give the owner of the business time to
form new contracts and put the business back on course. But these cases
otherwise have to. Second, Scott had guaranteed a $78,000 secured loan from the bank.
See Schedule D at 1, In re Nieman, No. 98-00356. By putting Nieman Industries in
bankruptcy, Scott could ensure that whatever assets existed went to the bank rather than,
let us say, to trade creditors, as would likely have happened if the business had continued
to operate outside of bankruptcy.
110. Small entrepreneurs are liquidity constrained. Using data on entrepreneurs
between 1981 and 1985, one study found that a $100,000 inheritance increased the
probability of becoming self-employed by 3.3% (from 19.3% to 22.6%). See Douglas
Holtz-Eakin et al., Entrepreneurial Decisions and Liquidity Constraints, 25 RAND J. Econ.
334, 342 (1994). An entrepreneur is more likely to stay in business if he or she receives a
bequest. Douglas Holtz-Eakin et al., Sticking it Out: Entrepreneurial Survival and
Liquidity Constraints, 102 J. Pol. Econ. 53, 69 (1994). Using data on entrepreneurs
between 1981 and 1985, these authors found that a $150,000 inheritance increased the
probability of survival by about 1.3 percentage points (the average probability of survival
was 77.6%). Id. at 70-71. The implicit subsidy that Chapter 11 provides should work in
the same way at the margin.
111. We are, however, skeptical that many such businesses exist. We find vanishingly
few in our sample or elsewhere. Our economy includes a dwindling number of firms that
look anything like a railroad, or other exemplars of businesses with going-concern value.
See Greg Ip, Mind Over Matter: Why Many Highfliers Built on Big Ideas Are Such Fast
Fallers, Wall St. J., Apr. 4, 2002, at Al (stating that fifty years ago, tangible assets
represented 78% of assets of nonfinancial corporations; today that figure is 53%). The
proportion of employees working in the service industries has more than doubled over the
last thirty years. Compare U.S. Dep't of Labor, Handbook of Labor Statistics 61 (1977),
with Handbook of U.S. Labor Statistics 70 tbl.1-14 (Eva E. Jacobs ed., 7th ed. 2004). As of
1997, more than twice as many people worked in service industries as in manufacturing.
See U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States 544 tbl.867 (2000),
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/statab/sec17.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review). The ability to outsource has also left even large-scale manufacturers
less dependent on their own plants and equipment. More than a third of Boeing's latest
airplane is being made in Japan. Peter Pae, Japanese Helping 787 Take Wing, L.A. Times,
May 9, 2005, at Cl.
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are rare, as we showed in Part II.A, and Nieman Industries was not one of
them. To the extent that the Bankruptcy Code is interpreted (as some
advocate)' 12 to allow cases like Nieman to linger, we are not preserving
going-concern value, but are instead distorting the career path of the
owner-operator.
At least in the Northern District, however, the Bankruptcy Code
causes relatively little distortion of the small entrepreneur's career path.
Judges are willing to make tough choices when the appropriate motions
are put before them.'1 3 When bankruptcy judges are willing to confront
issues directly and resolve them quickly, Chapter 11 creates little or no
distortion, and such was the case with Nieman Industries. One month
after the filing, the equipment lessor moved to repossess the equipment;' 1 4 the same day, the debtor moved to dismiss, admitting it was unable to effectuate a plan. 115 Both motions were continued to a hearing
one month later, when the judge dismissed the case. 116 The corporation
was dissolved under state law a few weeks after that.1 1 7 Scott no longer
had a business that manufactured plastic parts, but nothing kept him
from starting a new one that did exactly the same thing. But Scott's comparative advantage lay in identifying those who needed plastic parts and
matching them with those who could make them, rather than in manufacturing the parts themselves. Scott's next business took advantage of
his expertise and his relationships, but without the fixed overhead costs
that doomed Nieman Industries. He became a successful supplier of customized plastic parts who subcontracted the actual manufacturing to
others. 1 8 The court's willingness to take decisive action induced Scott to
find a business that better matched his skills with the marketplace. It is
no more desirable that Scott Nieman spend his life overseeing a manufacturing operation than that Yo-Yo Ma play the violin.' 19
112. See, e.g., Dickerson, supra note 22, at 117 ("Without chapter 11, it would be
virtually impossible for the owner to continue his trade (as a lawyer, chiropractor,
plumber, etc .... ) or to start another small business (like an insurance company or funeral
home) unless he could discharge the business debts before attempting to sort out his
personal debts.").
113. See Morrison, Continuation Bias, supra note 1 (manuscript at 11-16) (showing
that over 60% of Chapter 11 filings were dismissed or converted to Chapter 7, that
bankruptcy judges rendered over 40% of these orders within first three months of case and
over 70% within first six months, and that "no party with a predictable bias-debtors or
creditors-completely dominates the bankruptcy process; to the contrary, bankruptcy
judges appear to play an important role in determining when a firm should be shut
down").
114. Motion to Compel Debtor to Assume or Reject Truck Lease, In re Nieman, No. 9800356.
115. Motion to Voluntarily Dismiss Chapter 11 at 1, In re Nieman, No. 98-00356.
116. Order Dismissing Chapter 11 at 1, In re Nieman, No. 98-00356.
117. See supra note 99.
118. Telephone Interview with Richard Nieman, supra note 101.
119. The analogy is Richard Thaler's. See Richard Thaler, Address: "Finding Your
Cello," U. Chi. Rec., Nov. 6, 2003, at 7. As Thaler points out, Yo-Yo Ma began as an
indifferent violinist and discovered his genius only when he switched to the cello. Id. If he
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C. The Case of Restaurants
Restaurants require large capital investments relative to other small
businesses. An investment of $150,000 is needed to start even a modest
fast-food operation, such as a mid-range Subway sandwich shop. 120 One
million dollars or more is needed to open a fine-dining restaurant. It
might seem that these businesses fit the conventional account of Chapter
11: They depend on specialized assets and may need the protection of
Chapter 11 to ensure that the assets are not wasted and going-concern
surplus destroyed. After all, a restaurateur cannot begin a new restaurant
the way a travel agent or insurance broker can open a new office.
Here again, however, matters are more complicated than they appear. Restaurant kitchen equipment itself is not expensive. 121 Indeed,
the ovens and stoves used in restaurants cost less than high-end equipment for consumer use, as they have none of the insulation or finishes
that home kitchens require. The ranges, ovens, and counters are often
on wheels and in any event are readily moveable, and there is a robust
secondary market for them. The capital costs lie elsewhere. First, converting generic retail space into space suitable for a restaurant is expensive. Merely meeting health code requirements for everything from hand
sinks to grease traps to air vents can cost hundreds of thousands of dollars. But these investments are not tied to any particular restaurant venture. A Mexican restaurant can use the same walk-in refrigerator as readily as an Italian restaurant. Of course, if it turns out that the location is a
poor one for a restaurant, any money spent converting space dedicated to
that use will be lost, but Chapter 11 can do nothing to change this.
The build-out of the dining space can be costly. Moreover, it can be
lost if a particular restaurant venture is shut down. While the kitchen of a
three-star restaurant is barely distinguishable from one that serves the
most pedestrian country club food, the dining rooms of such restaurants
are different. These represent substantial capital investments that are
tightly tied to the business plan of the owner-operator. Converting the
decor of a dining room of an Italian restaurant to a seafood restaurant
often runs into the hundreds of thousands of dollars. These huge sunk
expenditures, however, are incurred only by a minority of restaurants.
While the decor of the upscale fine-dining restaurant can run into the
millions, the typical restaurant (and the one that typically ends up in
Chapter 11) is a modest affair. More to the point, the money invested is a
had not switched when he did, he might never have excelled at either. Exactly when Yo-Yo
Ma should have given up the violin admits of no easy answer. It is never easy to know when
to switch jobs or form new businesses. But nothing suggests that we make things better
with a legal rule that pushes the time forward or backward.
120. Doctor's Assocs., Inc., Subway Franchise Capital Requirements (Oct. 2005), at
http://www.subway.com/subwayroot/Development/O5dev/financial/capital_US.pdf (on
file with the Columbia Law Review).
121. This paragraph and the two following recap Baird & Rasmussen, Twilight, supra
note 77, at 685-89.
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sunk cost. The value of the carpeting, wall cover, and eclectic furniture
of a given restaurant turns entirely on the revenue they generate going
forward. They have value only if they bring in business.
TABLE

14:

DEBT COMPOSITION OF BUSINESSES IN CHAPTER

11

Businesses
with bank
debt
% (n) (sd)

Secured debt as % of
total debt, among
businesses with
secured debt median
(mean) (sd)

Businesses
with IRS debt
% (freq)
(sd)

IRS debt as %
of total debt, among
businesses with IRS
debt median
(mean) (sd)

Construction (15-17)

85.7 (14)

37.6 (36.9)

85.7 (14)

6.6 (11.1)

Manufacturing (20-39)

50.0 (12)

65.1 (63.8)

36.4 (11)

8.6 (34.3)

Transportation
(40-48)

25.0 (4)

25.6 (25.6)

33.3 (3)

0.6 (.6)

Wholesale Trade
(4813, 50-51)

100.0 (3)

52.1 (62.3)

33.3 (3)

6.5 (6.5)

Retail Trade (52-59)

57.1 (14)

41.8 (46.9)

41.7 (12)

1.5 (11.5)

Eating/Drinking Places

26.3 (19)

26.7 (40.8)

68.4(19)

21.0 (25.0)

Insurance Agents
(60-69)

0 (3)

NA

66.7 (3)

1.6 (1.6)

Business Services
(47-49, 70-79)

50.0 (18)

41.6 (46.1)

56.3 (16)

22.6 (29.8)

Professional Services
(80-89)

52.9 (17)

52.4 (51.7)

76.5 (17)

22.4 (30.3)

TOTAL

51.0 (104)
(50.23)

43.6 (47.1)
(25.36)

61.2 (98)
(48.97)

12.7 (22.0)
(24.94)

Industry (SIC No.)

(58)

Our data suggest that restaurants in financial distress are also in economic distress. Restaurants are so prone to fail that they often have no
institutional lenders at all. As Table 14 illustrates, only 26% of restaurants in Chapter 11 have any institutional debt, making this industry one
of the least likely to have bank debt. Even among restaurants that do
have bank debt, it accounts for only a quarter of the debt of the median
business. Among businesses in other industries, it accounts for nearly
half of the debt burden. With debt burdens so low, why are restaurants
failing? It is because failing restaurants cannot pay for their ongoing operations. They are in financial distress because they are in economic distress. Restaurants are, for example, among the most likely to have IRS
debt (68%). And among those with IRS debt, unpaid taxes account for
21% of total debt, a much higher percentage than we find in any other
type of business outside of the services sector.
Most restaurants in Chapter 11, then, have business models that have
failed. They begin with little or no debt in the capital structure, and they
get into trouble because they cannot even meet their operating expenses.
The restaurant stays in business by stretching out payments to trade creditors, falling behind on payments to the landlord, and then invading the
trusts established for withholding taxes. The restaurant's inability to pay
creditors signals that it has no future as a going concern. The hard assets
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may be specialized, but they are not worth saving on that account. Specialized assets that cannot generate a positive cash flow are worthless; they
122
are liabilities.
Three restaurants in our sample did reorganize successfully. They
remain in business today. The Chapter 11, however, had little to do with
preserving going-concern value. Consider, for example, the Chapter 11
of a Subway sandwich shop that had been sold to a new owner only a few
months before. 123 The owner-operator of a Subway sandwich shop was
inexperienced 24 and the business operated at a loss.' 25 Mistakes included hiring too large a staff and overpaying sales tax. 126 The short time
spent in Chapter 11 allowed him to fix these problems. He fired full-time
workers and replaced them with a succession of part-time workers in addition to other management changes. 12 7 He proposed and confirmed a
1 29
100% plan1 28 and several years later sold the business to someone else
and, as we have seen many times, went on to run another one.' 30
This entrepreneur's successful use of Chapter 11 is different from
the usual story told about Chapter 11. The business had little in the way
of specialized assets. The equipment in a Subway sandwich shop is usually leased and is readily moved.' 3 ' The money needed to convert a
leased storefront to a Subway franchise is small. 132 Indeed, it was sufficiently small that this business moved two doors down the street after the
Chapter 11 ended. 133 Far from the assets being tied to a particular location, it was possible to close at one location on one day and open at the
new one (with the same equipment) the next. 3 4 There was no collective
decisionmaking involved either, but rather tough decisions (such as replacing all the permanent employees with part-time workers) that successful entrepreneurs need to make to survive. This case, unlike the over122. See, e.g., SB North Group, Inc., No. 98-12609 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Aug. 6, 1998).
123. In re TC Rests., Inc., No. 98-09502 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 1998).
124. First Amended Disclosure Statement of TC Restaurants, Inc. at 7, In re TC Rests.,
No. 98-09502 ("Debtor was new to the fast food industry .... ).
125. Id. at 8 ("Debtor maintained its operations by using funds earmarked for the IRS
and [Illinois Department of Revenue] for operating and rent related expenses.").
126. Id. at 7.

127. Id.
128. Id. at 1-2 (explaining that all creditors will be paid in full).
129. Telephone Interview with Manager, Subway Restaurant (Nov. 11, 2002) (on file
with the Columbia Law Review).
130. See Motion for Confirmation of Arbitration Award at 2 & Exhibit C, Doctor's
Assocs., Inc. v. Ciatteo, No. 1:03-cv-08241 (N.D. I11.
Nov. 18, 2003) (explaining that
entrepreneur ran Subway Sandwich Shop in Tinley Park and leased the real estate
beginning in January 2002).
131. Doctor's Assocs., Inc., supra note 120 (indicating that equipment is leased from
Subway company, known formally as Doctor's Associates, Inc.).
132. The Subway headquarters estimates that leasehold improvements range from
$45,000 to $100,000. Id.
133. Telephone Interview with Manager, Subway Restaurant, supra note 129.
134. Id.
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whelming majority of the other restaurants in the sample, had a business
plan that was fundamentally sound.
A similar theme emerges from the case of Taco Fiesta.' 3 5 The
owner-operator of a thriving Mexican restaurant opened another at a different location that failed.1 36 The business ended up owing the landlord
at the second location almost $60,000.137 The owner-operator and a business partner were personally liable for this debt. 13 8 In this case, the challenge the owner-operator faced was one of returning to his core competence. He likely could have done this by walking away from this
restaurant, filing his own personal bankruptcy petition, and starting a
new restaurant. But it was marginally easier to keep running this restaurant and use Chapter 11 to resolve disputes with the outstanding
39
creditors.1
Again, the problem in In re Taco Fiesta had little to do with preservation of specialized assets. Instead it was a case in which the serial entrepreneur was able to match his human capital with a business by returning
to the sound business embedded inside the one that failed. The Chapter
11 succeeded not because it preserved going-concern value, but because
it did not distort the entrepreneur's decisionmaking. He would have
continued running Taco Fiesta even if the benefits of Chapter 11 were
not tied to the business itself.
As we show in Part III, this is the striking characteristic of the successful Chapter 11 reorganization. A successful business emerges only if the
entrepreneur's skills are matched with a business already inside the existing one. To be sure, Chapter 11 may reduce transaction costs in cases
like In re Taco Fiesta. If an owner-operator successfully operates a business
but fails in an effort to expand it, Chapter II can help him or her return
to the old business. The net effect of Chapter 11, however, is unclear
even here. The bankruptcy process comes with its own administrative
costs. In any event, Chapter 11 rarely succeeds when there is no core
business inside the existing corporate shell to which the entrepreneur
can return. As we discuss in the next Part, the Chapter 11 process simply
135. In re Taco Fiesta, Inc., No. 98-06239 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 15, 1998).
136. Debtor's Disclosure Statement at 6, In re Taco Fiesta, No. 98-06239.
137. Id. at 6-7.
138. Id. at 7 (noting that debtor and its principal were named defendants in
landlord's suit); Schedule H, In re Taco Fiesta, No. 98-06239 (listing business partner as
codebtor on liabilities owed to landlord); see also Schedule F, In re Salud Cortez, No. 9807714 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Apr. 17, 1998) (acknowledging debt to landlord in owneroperator's personal bankruptcy filing); Schedule F, In re Juan Corona, No. 98-06247
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. Apr. 6, 1998) (acknowledging debt owed by business partner to landlord
in personal filing).
139. In this case, as in one other successful reorganization, the owner-operator filed a
personal bankruptcy petition at the same time. See In re Salud Cortez, No. 98-07714.
Personal bankruptcy petitions are relatively common at some point in the careers of the
serial entrepreneurs in our sample. About forty percent filed their own personal
bankruptcy petition at one time or another.
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does not align itself with the needs of the serial entrepreneur in any other
environment.
III. WIHY

CHAPTER

11?

In Part II, we showed that entrepreneurs rarely use Chapter 11 to
preserve going-concern surplus. This Part asks why entrepreneurs use
Chapter 11 at all. If the typical small entrepreneur is searching for the
right match between her human capital and a business, why would she
use Chapter 11 to remain with her financially distressed business rather
than start a new one? The short answer is that she does not. Fewer than
1% of entrepreneurs running a failing business turn to Chapter 11.140
The typical small entrepreneur does not linger with a financially distressed business. Entrepreneurs who try one business usually cut their
losses and go on to start another when the first fails.
Even so, the appropriate question is not why so few entrepreneurs
use Chapter 11, but why any do, given that it does little or nothing to
preserve going-concern value. Our study of the Northern District points
to several possible answers: asset sales,' 41 bargaining leverage, 1 42 temporary liquidity, 143 and renegotiation of personal guarantees. 144 Asset sales
are often accomplished more easily and efficiently in a Chapter 11 proceeding than under state law. These cases, however, are only a minority
of Chapter lls. 14 5 Most businesses enter bankruptcy not to avoid inefficiencies cured by Chapter 11 but rather to exploit potential inefficiencies
created by the Code, including the entrepreneur's enhanced bargaining
46
power in disputes with a creditor, landlord, or some other third party.'
140. Owner-operators shut down more than a million businesses each year. See
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Business Employment Dynamics, Custom Tables, at http://
data.bls.gov/PDQ/outside.jsp?survey=bd (last visited Oct. 17, 2005) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (showing that total closings of private establishments ranged from
1.1 to 1.4 million per year between 1994 and 2004). By contrast, only around 10,000 file
Chapter 11 petitions. See Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, 1990-2002 Calendar Year
Bankruptcy Filings by Chapter and District, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
bnkrpctystats/Bk2002-199OCalendar.pdf (last visited Sept. 18, 2005) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (reporting 8,000 to 15,000 Chapter 11 filings per year between 1994
and 2002). Even this overstates the importance of Chapter 11, as many Chapter 11 filings
involve individuals or represent multiple filings by related entities or serial filings by the
same entity.
141. See infra Part III.A.
142. See infra Part III.B.
143. See infra Part III.C.
144. See infra Part III.C.
145. Over the population of Chapter 11 cases as a whole, asset sales take place only in
a minority. See infra Table 15. If we focus on larger cases, however, sales are more
common and may take place in half the cases or more. See Baird & Rasmussen, Twilight,
supra note 77, at 675-76.
146. See infra Table 15 (presenting evidence of this type of strategic behavior in Panel
B). Many others have noted that entrepreneurs commonly use Chapter 11 for this
purpose. See, e.g., Brian A. Blum, The Goals and Process of Reorganizing Small
Businesses in Bankruptcy, 4J. Small & Emerging Bus. L. 181, 207 (2000). Indeed, this
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Yet another benefit of Chapter 11 is the availability of temporary liquidity:
Upon filing a petition, the entrepreneur can suspend debt service and
defer or cap breach-of-contract claims. 147 With this temporary liquidity,
she can take steps to resurrect or reorient the business. Lastly there is the
phenomenon of personal guarantees, which are ubiquitous in small business cases. Chapter 11 may offer an attractive venue for renegotiating
these guarantees, perhaps because the bankruptcy petition is a way for
the entrepreneur to credibly signal that her financial affairs have worsened to the point that renegotiation is necessary.
The latter two attractions of Chapter 11-temporary liquidity and
renegotiation of personal guarantees-come with a cost. They encourage owner-operators to remain in existing business structures instead
of founding new ones (or seeking employment). This lock-in effect distorts the career trajectories of entrepreneurs. Whether this distortion
outweighs the benefits of Chapter 11 is unclear, but our data provide
strong evidence that the lock-in effect is prevalent in small business bankruptcies. We present this evidence after exploring the reasons entrepreneurs are drawn to Chapter 11 in the first place.
A. Asset Sales
14 8
For small businesses as well as large ones, Chapter 11 offers a way
for a financially distressed business to sell its assets free and clear of encumbrances and creditor claims 149 and then divide the proceeds among
the claimants. As Panel A of Table 15 shows, in about 11% of the Chapter 11 petitions in the Northern District (eleven cases), the business entered bankruptcy to sell assets, with the bankruptcy judge typically serving
as auctioneer, either by approving a motion to sell assets or by confirming
a plan of reorganization that contemplated substantial assets sales. In
about half of these cases (five cases), the business entered Chapter 11
solely to sell itself as a going concern to the highest bidder. The remaining six businesses entered bankruptcy primarily to sell assets and use the
proceeds to increase cash flow sufficiently to overcome their financial distress. As Panel A indicates, for most of these businesses (five cases) the

behavior was the impetus for many of the amendments to Chapter 11 that brought about
the latest overhaul of the Bankruptcy Code. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, §§ 431-445, 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. (119 Stat. 87) 23,
109-17 (to be codified in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.).
147. Bankruptcy's automatic stay suspends obligations to general creditors for the
duration of the case. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2000) (amended 2005). Prepetition
obligations under executory contracts and leases are treated as ordinary claims in the event
they are rejected and put in abeyance until assumption, something that may take many
months. See id. § 365. Damages under real property leases are capped under § 502(b) (6).
148. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (permitting sales outside ordinary course, after notice
and hearing).
149. See id. § 363(f) (permitting sales "free and clear of any interest in [the]
property," with some exceptions).
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sale did not ensure a successful Chapter 11 by the traditional metric; they
ended up in liquidation or with their cases dismissed.
Using Chapter 11 to effect a sale of the assets is especially likely when
one of the potential buyers identified before the bankruptcy is allied with
the current owner-operator. The Chapter 11 process ensures that the
sale brings top dollar and prevents self-dealing. 150 Billy's Good Life Caf6
illustrates how assets are sold in Chapter 11.151 Billy Moss had opened
other restaurants before attempting the Good Life Cafe. 15 2 He had to
make a large capital investment to convert the space into the caf6 he
desired.1 53 When it failed, there was no possibility of a going-concern
sale. Any restaurant on this site (even one run by Billy) would have to
change the d6cor, the menu, and the market niche in order to succeed.
Nevertheless, any new restaurant would be able to take advantage of the
investment already made in converting the space into a restaurant. As a
serial entrepreneur, Billy Moss might be the one who put the highest
value on this space. Outside of bankruptcy, however, neither Billy nor a
group allied with him could acquire the asset from the corporation and
be confident that they could take it free from the debts of the existing
business. 154 Chapter 11, however, provides a mechanism that allows Billy
to bid for the asset and take it free of the claims of the creditors in the
event he turns out to be the person who values it the most. As it happened, another group proved to be the high bidder. 155 Like the Good
Life Cafe, the restaurant it opened failed too. 156 The space finally be-

150. Baird & Rasmussen, End of Bankruptcy, supra note 59, at 786-88 (emphasizing
efficiencies of asset sales within Chapter 11).
151. In re Good Life Enters., No. 98-13120 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Aug. 27, 1998).
152. See Jodie Jacobs, The Good Life Starts with Eating Well, Chicago Trib., Nov. 3,
1996, at Tempo 5.
153. Debtor's schedules indicate that it received over $700,000 in secured financing.
In light of the fact that debtor filed its petition less than two years after opening its doors, it
seems likely that most of this financing was used to convert the space into a caf6. See
Schedule D at 2, In re Good Life Enters., No. 98-13120; Jacobs, supra note 152 (noting that
Billy's Good Life Cafe opened its doors in August 1996).
154. And a group allied with Billy did want to purchase the restaurant. In bankruptcy,
the top bid for the business was submitted by Billy's brother-in-law (Billy's wife was the
restaurant's president). See Emergency Motion to Stay Order Dated August 3, 1998 at 1,
In re Good Life Enters., No. 98-13120; Motion for Authority to Sell Assets Pursuant to Section
363 of the Bankruptcy Code and for Other Relief at 3, In re Good Life Enters., No. 98-13120.
The bid failed, however, because it was opposed by the cafe's landlord. Motion for
Authority, In re Good Life Enters., at 2.
155. See Order Finding that [sic] the Wong Group to be a Good Faith Purchaser and
Granting Other Relief, In re Good Life Enters., No. 98-13120.
156. The Wong Group founded Good Life Entertainment, LLC, on August 21, 1998.
According to Illinois Records, the corporation had dissolved in 2001. See Illinois Secretary
of State Public Records, available at LEXIS, ILREC Database (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
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came a successful restaurant (serving Mexican food) under its third
57
owners.1
For both large cases and small, Chapter 11 is becoming the platform
that allows the sale of assets free and clear of old claims and encumbrances. If one were designing a legal system from scratch, it is not obvious that one would want a mechanism originally designed for restructuring nineteenth century railroads to provide the avenue for a goingconcern sale of assets. 158 Nevertheless, Chapter 11 seems to work effectively in this environment.
B. BargainingPower
TABLE

15: REASONS

FOR FILING CHAPTER

11

PETITIONS,

By

CASE OUTCOME
Shutdowns
& Dismissals
(n=65)
% (freq)

Reorganizations
(n=23)
% (freq)

Restructurings
without a
plan (n=8)
% (freq)

Going
Concern Sales
(n=8)
% (freq)

62.5 (5)

Panel A. Types of Chapter II
Filings
Asset sales

7.7 (5)

12.5 (1)

Exploiting bargaining power

13.8 (9)

50.0 (4)

All Cases
(n=104)
% (freq)

10.6 (11)
12.5 (13)

Lock-In

49.0 (51)

Traditional Chapter lls

26.9 (28)

Panel B: Evidence of Lock-In
Ignoring procedural
requirements

60.0 (39)

Failing to pay ongoing
expenses

26.2 (17)

16.3 (17)

Using Ch. 11 to favor
insider-creditors

1.5 (1)

1.0 (1)

Any evidence of Lock-In

12.5 (1)

76.9 (50)

Panel C: Evidence of
"Traditional Cases"
Overexpansion

7.7 (5)

47.8 (11)

12.5 (1)

38.5 (40)

12.5 (1)

49.0 (51)

25.0 (2)

18.3 (19)

37.5 (3)

7.7 (8)

Prepetition fraud or other
malfeasance

7.7 (5)

Cash shortages from loss of
customers

9.2 (6)

13.0 (3)

12.5 (1)

9.6 (10)

Cost overruns from
reconfiguring business

3.1 (2)

13.0 (3)

25.0 (2)

6.7 (7)

27.7 (18)

78.3 (18)

50.0 (4)

62.5 (5)

43.3 (45)

7.7 (5)

78.3 (18)

12.5 (1)

37.5 (3)

26.0 (27)

Asbestos liability

4.3 (1)

Any Traditional Event
Traditional Events,
excluding sales, lock-in, etc.

1.0 (1)

157. The authors obtained this information by contacting the Bannockburn Village
Hall on October 4, 2002. This story is not unusual. For an example of a restaurant that
went through five incarnations (and two bankruptcies) before finding its niche, see Baird
& Rasmussen, Twilight, supra note 77, at 687-89.
158. On the railroad origins of Chapter 11, see Skeel, supra note 10, at 48-70.
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Some entrepreneurs are drawn to Chapter 11 because it gives them a
unique opportunity to extract concessions from creditors. In at least thirteen cases in our sample (12.5%), as Panel A of Table 15 shows, the
owner-operators filed a petition to exploit their leverage vis-a-vis landlords and other claimants.1 59 In many other cases, exploitation of bargaining power was an important part of the reason for filing.
Consider, for example, In re Myron & Phil's Steak House.160 The owners fired two employees, who subsequently brought suit. One alleged sexual harassment and age discrimination; the other racial discrimination.16 1 The first case went to trial, but less than fifteen minutes after it
began, the owners put the restaurant in Chapter 11.162 This well-established restaurant had few problems other than these disgruntled employees. The Chapter 11 changed the dynamics of the negotiations between
the owner-operators of the business and the employee. Once the lawsuit
163
was settled, the case was dismissed.
Another case in which Chapter 11 was used to change bargaining
dynamics is In re ABO Taxicab.164 In this case, the creditor that had financed the purchase of the medallions threatened to levy on the assets.1 65 As in In re Myron & Phil's, no other creditors were in the picture. 166 The Chapter 11 again changed the bargaining dynamics and
once the parties reached agreement, the case was dismissed. As in so
many other Chapter 11 cases, there were no business-specific assets, and
the entrepreneur was able to and did in fact start many other businesses. 167 Indeed, the entrepreneur in ABO started at least ten other cab
159. We coded a case as "exploiting bargaining power" when the debtor remained in
Chapter 11 only as long as necessary to reach a compromise with a single creditor (usually
a tort victim or landlord) or when the primary issue in the case was a dispute with a
landlord, which typically had commenced eviction proceedings prior to the filing.
160. In re Myron & Phil's Steak House, Inc., No. 98-00726 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Feb. 3,
1999).
161. Disclosure Statement at 4, In re Myron & Phil's, No. 98-00726.
162. Emergency Motion to Lift Automatic Stay at 1-2, In re Myron & Phil's, No. 9800726.
163. Motion to Shorten Notice Under Bankruptcy Rule 2002(4) and to Dismiss
Chapter 11 Bankruptcy at 2, In re Myron & Phil's, No. 98-00726.
164. In re ABO Taxicab Ass'n, No. 98-23646 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Sept. 16, 1998).
165. We infer this from the debtor's motion to dismiss, which states that "[t]here is
only a single Creditor in this case" and "[s]ince . . . filing Debtor and Creditor have
reached an agreement on the subject of liabilities." Motion for Dismissal of Case for Cause
Under Section 1112(b) at 1, In re ABO Taxicab, No. 98-23646. Debtor, then, filed this
Chapter 11 petition to buy time and obtain leverage in negotiations with the creditor.
166. Id.
167. The owner-entrepreneur's other businesses included First ABO Taxicab, A. Adu
Cab Co., Afrique Transportation, Inc., Alop & Associates, Inc., Buskie Cab Co., G. Money
Cab Co., Micro Cab Co., Nataco International, Osko Cab Co., 5165 Taxi Corp., and 5280
Yiadom Cab Inc. Some of these businesses are mentioned in Motion to Consolidate at 2,
In re First ABO Taxicab, Inc., No. 03-36193 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Oct. 2, 2003); others are
documented in the Illinois Secretary of State Public Records, available at LEXIS, ILREC
Database (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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companies, one of which also entered Chapter 11, again resolving a dispute with the creditor who had financed the purchase of the
medallions. 168
Some cases involve both a sale and a strengthening of the bargaining
hand. M&V Corp. 169 was a family-run music and video retailer founded
January 31, 1983.170 It entered Chapter 11 so it could sell a piece of real
estate upon which state tax authorities would have otherwise foreclosed. 171 Once the sale took place, the case was dismissed. 172 The business itself subsequently closed, 173 but there was again no particular goingconcern surplus associated with it. The owner-operator then directed his
attention to a different music and video store-his third (at least). 17 4
In part because of the special treatment of leases and executory contracts, 175 entrepreneurs sometimes use Chapter 11 to improve their positions with their landlords or parties with whom they have long-term contracts. One case, for example, involved a Greek restaurant that had fallen
behind on its rent. 176 Its landlord had the chance to sell the underlying
real estate to a third party. By filing for bankruptcy and curing the default, the restaurant ensured that it could share in the premium that the
177
landlord obtained from the sale.
168. In re FirstABO, No. 03-36193.
169. In re M&V Corp., No. 98-14680 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 1998).
170. See Statement of Financial Affairs at 3, In re M&V, No. 98-14680 (indicating that
Jeanne and Edward Carter owned and managed business); Voluntary Petition at 1, In re
M&V, No. 98-14680 (indicating that M&V Co. was "music and video enterprise"); Illinois
Secretary of State Corporation and LLC Information, available at LEXIS, ILREC Database
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (indicating founding date of corporation).
171. Motion for Authority to Sell Real Property at 1-2, In re M&V, No. 98-14680.
172. Order Dismissing Case at 1, In re M&V, No. 98-14680.
173. Illinois records indicate that the business failed to file an annual report in 1999;
as a result, in June 2000, the state coded the business as "dissolved." Illinois Secretary of
State Public Records, available at LEXIS, ILREC Database (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
174. Illinois records indicate that Edward Carter founded Metro Music Corp. in
December 1971 and Metro Records, Inc. in February 1997. Both businesses failed to
submit 1999 annual reports to the state and were coded as "dissolved" in May and July
2000, respectively. See id.
175. See 11 U.S.C. § 365 (2000). For an overview of executory contracts and leases,
see Baird, Elements of Bankruptcy, supra note 37, at 109-29.
176. In re Acropolis, Inc., No. 98-27045 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 1998); see also
Motion for Authority to Assume Executory Lease at 2, In re Acropolis, No. 98-27045
("Acropolis was in default under the terms of the [real estate] lease .... ").
177. The purchaser would not buy the land unless Acropolis rejected its lease and
surrendered possession of the premises. Acropolis used this condition to its advantage,
forcing the landlord-seller to pay $154,000 in exchange for its commitment to reject the
lease and move out. See Motion of Debtor in Possession to Reject It's [sic] Executory
Lease at 2, In re Acropolis, No. 98-27045.
When Chapter 11 can be used to capture such substantive benefits, we should be
aware that it will have an effect on bargaining that takes place outside of bankruptcy. A
debtor who can credibly threaten to invoke section 365 in bankruptcy should be able to
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C. Liquidity, Guarantees, and Lock-In
Asset sales and simple exploitation of bargaining power account for
only about 23% of the sample. For the remaining cases, Chapter 11
largely serves as a venue in which a small-business owner can (temporarily) fend off landlords and trade creditors, increase short-term cash flow,
and cut deals with large creditors-usually secured lenders and the IRSto whom the owner had given personal guarantees of the business's indebtedness. 178 Thanks to the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay and priority rules, 179 a small business can operate in bankruptcy free from creditor collection efforts and is barred from servicing its debt until a plan of
reorganization is confirmed. Additionally, the business can assume profitable executory contracts, reject (i.e., breach) unprofitable ones, and defer paying breach-of-contract damages until a plan is confirmed (and, in
the case of real estate leases, these damages will be capped),18° These
provisions of the Code improve a small business's liquidity, at least for a
short while, largely at the expense of unsecured creditors and landlords.
1. Temporary Liquidity. - Liquidity is an important determinant of
the lifespan of small businesses. While starting a new business is not
costly, 18 ' it is not costless either. Owner-operators do not have ready access to credit markets. The risks associated with any new business are
large and much of the money needed to start the business is not recoverable unless the business succeeds. 18 2 For outside investors, the costs of
gathering enough information to distinguish the bad risks from the good
are too large. Moreover, the owner-operators who run these businesses
enjoy substantial nonmonetary returns. They are willing to accept less
18 3
income and fewer prospects for growth in income to run the business.
capture the benefits in bargaining with the landlord or contracting party without actually
having to file.
178. A promise not to file for bankruptcy is ordinarily unenforceable. See United
States v. Royal Bus. Funds Corp., 724 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1983) (noting "the general rul[e]
that a debtor may not agree to waive the right to file a bankruptcy petition"). Exceptions
typically arise only when there is a comprehensive workout outside of bankruptcy. See,
e.g., In re Colonial Ford, 24 B.R. 1014, 1020 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982). Hence, the distortions
Chapter 11 introduces cannot be cashed out in advance through Coasean bargaining.
179. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 362, 507. As a general matter, payments to general creditors are
forbidden during the pendency of the case. See In re Kmart, 359 F.3d 866, 869 (7th Cir.
2004).
180. In the case of real estate leases, these damages will be capped. See 11 U.S.C.
§§ 365, 502(b) (6).
181. Using data from the Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics, a survey of
individuals preparing to start new businesses, a recent study found that the median
estimated startup cost was $6,000 for solo ventures and $20,000 for ventures founded by
teams of entrepreneurs. Blade Consulting Corp., Expected Costs of Startup Ventures 1-2
(2003), at http://sba.gov/advo/research/rs232tot.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
182. Over thirty percent of new businesses fail in their first two years. See Knaup,
supra note 71, at 51.
183. Hamilton, supra note 66, at 622.
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The psychic benefits they enjoy do not form the basis on which outsiders
make investments. Thus, owner-operators are more likely to keep running their own businesses if they receive an inheritance. 18 4 At the margin, anything that makes running a particular business cheaper will make
an entrepreneur more likely to remain with that business.
2. PersonalGuarantees. - In addition to providing short-term liquidity, Chapter 11 offers a venue in which the entrepreneur can strike deals
with creditors to whom she will be personally liable if the business fails to
repay them in full. The vast majority of small businesses (85%, as shown
in Table 17 below) will enter bankruptcy with debts that have been personally guaranteed by the owner-operator. These debts are generally
owed to secured lenders and the IRS, both of whom are willing to renegotiate the debts and the personal guarantees if the entrepreneur brings
her business into bankruptcy.18 5 This is true for several reasons. First,
and perhaps most importantly, the bankruptcy process is a form of "costly
state verification," much like an audit in the insurance context.' 8 6
Outside of bankruptcy, creditors have imperfect information about the
value of the business's assets; although they may be willing to renegotiate
the debts of the business and its entrepreneur, they may not trust the
entrepreneur's representations regarding asset value. The bankruptcy
process offers a mechanism for overcoming this information asymmetry,
allowing creditors to verify (and entrepreneurs to demonstrate credibly)
187
the value of the business's assets.
In theory, these benefits mightjustify the Chapter 11 process. But to
make such a case for Chapter 11, it must be proven that alternative mechanisms cannot serve the same purpose at lower cost. Such proof is important because the costs of Chapter 11-particularly the lock-in effect-may
be of little or no concern to banks, the IRS, and others interested in verifying the business's condition. Chapter 11 offers them a court-subsidized
venue in which to achieve the same negotiations that they might under184. An entrepreneur is more likely to start a business if he or she has greater
personal wealth or receives bequests. See David G. Blanchflower & Andrew J. Oswald,
What Makes an Entrepreneur?, 16J. Lab. Econ. 26, 35-43 (1998); Dunn & Holtz-Eakin,
supra note 68, at 292-94; Holtz-Eakin et al., supra note 110, at 342-46.
185. The IRS generally does not pursue delinquent withholding taxes against an
individual responsible for them while the Chapter 11 of the corporation is pending, nor
while it is making payments under a plan of reorganization. See IRS, Internal Revenue
Manual, 5.7.4.8.3, Trust Fund Taxpayer in Bankruptcy (Apr. 1, 2005), at http://
www.irs.gov/irm/part5/ch07sO4.html#d0e59602 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
186. There is a vast literature on costly state verification and its various applications.
The literature was launched by Robert M. Townsend, Optimal Contracts and Competitive
Markets with Costly State Verification, 21 J. Econ. Theory 265 (1979). For a brief overview,
see Patrick Bolton & Mathias Dewatripont, Contract Theory 190-97 (2005).
187. See, e.g., Bolton & Dewatripont, supra note 186, at 190 ("Viewed from the [costly
state verification] perspective, the main function of bankruptcy institutions is to establish a
clear inventory of all assets and liabilities and to assess the net value of the firm."). For
formal models illustrating this function, see Giammarino, supra note 28, at 35-36; Webb,
supra note 28, at 285-87.
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take outside of bankruptcy. And the costs of this process are borne primarily by others, including unsecured creditors, who typically receive little or nothing from the reorganization process. 188 It is not possible to
justify Chapter 11 as it currently exists because of the liquidity or the verification mechanism it provides without taking these lock-in costs into
account.
For serial entrepreneurs, the opportunity to renegotiate personal
guarantees often drives the Chapter 11 process. Old debts to banks and
the IRS may hamstring efforts to start a new business. Although a personal Chapter 7 filing could discharge these debts, it is unattractive because the filing will have a negative effect on the entrepreneur's credit
rating 89 and will preclude another filing within the next six years (eight
years under the new legislation). 190 Other reasons could, of course, be
offered for the attractiveness of bankruptcy as a venue for renegotiating
guarantees. The process of renegotiating a guarantee, for example, may
give secured creditors and the IRS leverage over the Chapter 11 process.
Most owner-operators have little wealth to satisfy personal guarantees; the
typical entrepreneur has invested about half of her assets in her business.1 91 There is little, then, a creditor will gain from enforcing a personal guarantee in state courts. But enforcement will impose high costs
on owner-operators, who may be forced to file individual bankruptcy petitions. These costs give creditors bargaining power, which may be useful
during Chapter 11 proceedings, particularly because our data suggest
that the remaining creditors play a small or nonexistent role in the vast
majority of small business bankruptcies.
3. Labor Market Consequences: Evidence of Lock-in. - Together, increased liquidity and opportunities to renegotiate personal indebtedness
make Chapter 11 attractive to small business entrepreneurs. It allows the
entrepreneur to remain with a failing business for a while longer. In the
interim, she can hope that the business will turn around. In the absence
of Chapter 11, she would typically set out to open a new business that is a
better match with her human capital. But, with Chapter 11, continuing
188. See Douglas G. Baird et al., The Dynamics of Large and Small Chapter 11 Cases:
An Empirical Study 22-23 (May 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia
Law Review) [hereinafter Baird et al., Dynamics] (collecting data from Southern District of
New York and District of Arizona and finding that nonpriority unsecured creditors receive
only 3% of value of their claims in cases involving firms with assets worth less than
$200,000; recovery rises to 33% in cases involving firms with assets worth more than $1
million).
189. See generally Jonathan Fisher et al., Is the Bankruptcy Flag Binding? Access to
Credit Markets for Post-Bankruptcy Households, Am. Law & Econ. Ass'n Annual Meeting,
2004, Paper 28, available at http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1041&
context=alea (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (examining effect of bankruptcy
declaration after the bankruptcy no longer appears on the bankrupt's credit report).
190. 11 U.S.C. § 7 27(a)(8) (2000); Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 312, 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. (119 Stat. 87) 23,
86-87 (to be codified in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.).
191. See Gentry & Hubbard, supra note 67, at 22-25.
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with the old business is costless while starting a new one is not. To the
extent she can delay incurring those costs, she is better off. The Code in
these cases provides the most straightforward kind of lock-in effect.
Nearly 50% of the filings exhibit strong evidence of lock-in. 192 When
the owner-operator is not complying with even its most basic ground
rules, let alone trying to put together a viable plan of reorganization,
Chapter 11 is most likely doing little more than subsidizing a failed business. When the owner-operator violates an explicit order of the court,
fails to attend the mandatory meeting with the creditors, 193 or neglects to
fill out the forms listing the business's assets and liabilities, 194 we can
safely infer that she is merely playing a waiting game. These cases constitute about 39% of all the bankruptcy petitions filed in the Northern District in 1998, as shown by the row labeled "Ignoring Procedural Requirements" in Table 15. They make up 60% of all cases that ended with
shutdown or dismissal. Another important indicator of lock-in is whether
the owner-operator used Chapter 11 to avoid paying notjust outstanding
debt but also ongoing expenses.1 9 5 We see this indicator in about 16% of
96
the cases overall and 26% of cases ending in shutdown or dismissal.'
These are just the most obvious indicators of lock-in. Many others could
be proposed, such as the use of Chapter 11 to divert payments to insidercreditors (found in one case in our sample).
Chapter 11, then, allows the entrepreneur to play for time. An
owner-operator often files a Chapter 11 petition to prevent suppliers
from terminating resale or licensing agreements. 19 7 Then it ignores procedural requirements or stops paying ongoing expenses, all in a bid to
resurrect the business. Evidence that Chapter 11 is used for purposes of
delay is present in about 50% of all cases and 77% of all shutdowns and
dismissals. 19 8 In these cases, Chapter 11 induces the owner-operator to
remain with the business too long. Our point here is not the familiar one
that a Chapter 11 filing thwarts creditors. In most of these cases, there
192. See supra Table 15.
193. 11 U.S.C. § 343 ("The debtor shall appear and submit to examination under
oath at the meeting of creditors under section 341 (a) of this title.").
194. Id. § 521(a)(1) (obligating debtor to prepare reports detailing, among other
things, assets and liabilities and current income and expenditures).
195. We observed this indicator when creditors or the U.S. Trustee moved for
dismissal (or relief from the automatic stay) because the debtor was not paying ongoing
expenses or court-ordered adequate protection, or when the debtor admitted (typically in
a motion to dismiss) that revenues did not cover operating expenses.
196. See supra Table 15 (listing these cases in row labeled "Failing to pay ongoing
expenses").
197. See, e.g., Voluntary Petition, Form 1 at 1, In re Wireless Cellular, No. 98-24725
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. Aug. 7, 1998) (using Chapter 11 to delay termination of reseller
agreement between debtor cellular airtime wholesaler and Ameritech); Voluntary Petition,
Form B1 at 1-2, In re Cooper & Soble Ins. Agency, No. 98-20198 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. June 30,
1998) (using Chapter 11 to delay termination of debtor's license to sell insurance).
198. See supra Table 15.
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was little for the creditors in any event 1 9 9 Rather, Chapter 11 delays the
owner-operator's transition from an existing venture to a new one that
better matches with his or her skills. 200 But we should be careful not to
overstate the costs that Chapter 11 imposes. Cases in which the owneroperator is simply using Chapter 11 to keep a failing business around
longer are not hard for able judges to identify. Generally, within a few
weeks a creditor or a landlord brings a motion to dismiss, and the case
itself leaves the system quickly, typically within three months. 20 1 Thus it is
not surprising that so few failing businesses actually file bankruptcy
petitions.
So far, we have looked at lock-in without reference to those cases in
which the debtor is able to confirm a plan of reorganization. An initial
look at the data might suggest that lock-in is not a large issue in these
cases. As Panel C of Table 15 shows, eighteen of the twenty-three reorganization cases exhibited financial distress, a classic marker of a prototypical Chapter 11 case. 20 2 Most of these cases (eleven) suffered financial
distress as a result of overexpansion. 20 3 Three faced unexpected expenses in connection with the assets they had bought for their business.
199. The median firm, as Table 2 showed, had over three dollars of debt for every
dollar of assets. And most of these assets were encumbered by security interests: The
median firm had about $148,000 in assets but owed nearly $240,000 to secured creditors
and tax authorities, implying that little or nothing was available for unsecured creditors in
most cases. Baird, et al. reach the same conclusion using different data on small business
bankruptcies. See Baird, et al., Dynamics, supra note 188, at 22-23.
To the extent that Chapter 11 affected third parties, it was most often the landlord.
The automatic stay, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), prevents (at least temporarily, see § 365(d) (4)) the
eviction that would otherwise take place under state law.
200. A representative example is Automobile Dealer Services, a consulting business
that specialized in giving seminars for the employees of auto dealerships to train them to
sell appearance protection products-rust proofing, paint protection, fabric protection,
and sound treatment-that are designed to make a car look better and last longer. By the
time of the Chapter 11 petition, the entrepreneur had already formed a number of other
businesses. See Edmund 0. Lawler, That Magic Moment: No Longer a Startup, Crain's
Chi. Bus., Sept. 5, 1994, at 17 (reporting that owner had already started five other
businesses). Instead of refocusing his energies on the other businesses, the owneroperator turned to Chapter 11 to protect a business whose assets consisted entirely of cash,
receivables, and office equipment. Within 7 days of filing, the U.S. Trustee moved to
dismiss, citing the firm's failure to hire legal counsel. The case was dismissed a month
later; the entrepreneur, apparently, made no effort to hire counsel.
201. See Morrison, Continuation Bias, supra note 1 (manuscript at 31). Indeed, the
evidence is consistent with the conjecture that the judges are as adept in making these
shutdown decisions as market actors subject to the same constraints.
202. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
203. A business that overexpands, such as by opening additional stores that are soon
shut down, experiences financial distress because it must pay the additional obligations
that were incurred to fund the expansion, but has no new revenue to help meet them.
The old business remains sound and continues to generate the same revenues as before.
Because of the failed expansion, however, these are no longer sufficient to pay the
creditors in full. Hence, there is financial distress (an inability to pay creditors) without
economic distress (the old business remains sound and continues to use its assets
effectively).
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Another three businesses suffered distress because important clients cancelled contracts or because members of the business quit and took important clients with them. 20 4 Finally, one entered Chapter 11 with the classic
example of financial distress-asbestos liability arising from operations
the business had discontinued nearly forty years before. 20 5 In total, about
78% of the reorganizations (eighteen of the twenty-three) involved a business that exhibited a classic marker of financial-not economic-distress.
Chapter 11 might bring benefits in such cases if the businesses were viable and suffered distress only because of a temporary mismatch between
revenue and the cost of servicing debt.
A closer look at the data suggests this is not the case, however. As
Panel C also shows, similar markers of financial distress (such as overexpansion) can be found in 30% of businesses that were shut down in
bankruptcy or had their cases dismissed. As we saw, these businesses exhibited strong indicators of lock-in as well. To be sure, the observed incidence of "financial distress" among these businesses is inflated by the
number of cases involving "prepetition fraud or other malfeasance,"
something never observed in cases leading to reorganization. By "prepetition fraud or other malfeasance" we mean cases in which the business or
its managers defrauded creditors (by, say, diverting funds pledged to a
lender 20 6 ), breached fiduciary duties, 20 7 or committed other bad acts. 20 8
It is unsurprising that such fraud or malfeasance is never present in cases
resulting in reorganization; the tainted management has lost the trust of
creditors and a trustee is often appointed. Liability arising from fraud or
malfeasance, however, is a form of financial distress because the underlying business may still be profitable. Thus three of the cases exhibiting
fraud or malfeasance resulted in a going-concern sale.
204. Again, a one-time shock imposes payment obligations on the business without
creating additional revenue. Once the shock is gone, the underlying business is again
sound, but it cannot meet the additional financial burdens that the shock has imposed.
205. Here again the financial distress arising from the inability to pay decades-old
asbestos liabilities is independent of how the business is currently run.
206. See, e.g., Motion of American Equities Group, Inc., for Appointment of a
Chapter 11 Trustee 2-3, In re DeMert & Dougherty, Inc., No. 98-38160 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
Nov. 25, 1998) (stating that debtor admitted various breaches of a lending agreement,
including "convert[ing] an $18,000 check, which was tendered to the Debtor for payment
of an account receivable that had been purchased from the Debtor by [American Equities
Group]").
207. See, e.g., Examination of Cooper & Soble Insurance Agency, Inc., In re Cooper
& Soble Ins. Agency, No. 98-20198 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. June 30, 1998) (finding that debtor, an
insurance agent, had breached fiduciary duties by diverting client premiums to itself).
208. See, e.g., Scranton Gillette Commc'ns, Inc. v. Dannhausen, No. 96 C 8353, 1999
WL 558134 (N.D. I11.July 27, 1999) (upholding jury verdict holding debtor, McCormick
Communications Ltd., liable for breach of fiduciary duty; upholding jury's finding of
liability, but ordering new trial on damages, for false advertising); see also First Amended
Disclosure Statement 4, In re McCormick Commc'ns Ltd., No. 9840402 (Bankr. N.D. I11.
Dec. 16, 1998) (explaining that debtor "filed a petition for reorganization as a result of an
adverse judgment").

HeinOnline -- 105 Colum. L. Rev. 2360 2005

2005]

SERIAL ENTREPRENEURS AND CHAPTER 11

2361

The traditional markers of financial distress, then, tell us little about
the absence of lock-in. There are at least three reasons for this. First, our
"markers" of financial distress are based on the self-serving reports of the
owner-operators. 20 9 They have every incentive to convince judges and
other creditors that they were merely suffering temporary cash shortages.
Second, financial distress is often a product of economic distress.2 10 An
unprofitable business will often be one that loses significant clients or
takes on business it cannot serve.
TABLE

16:

MEASURES OF ASSET SPECIFICITY FOR THE MEDIAN BUSINESS, BY
CHAPTER 11 OUTCOME
All Cases
(n=104)
(%)

Shutdowns
& Dismissals
(n=65) (%)

Reorganizations
(n=23) (%)

Restructurings
Without Plan
(n=8) (%)

Going
Concern Sales
(n=8) (%)

Land &
Equipment

28.9

37.0

19.2

21.1

45.3

Equipment

16.5

16.5

12.9

13.7

38.9

Nonoffice
Equipment

5.5

5.3

8.5
(0.72)

9.1
(0.92)

22.3
(0.30)

Measure of
Specificity

Note. Parentheses provide p-values for a Wilcoxon rank-sum test of the difference between the median
in that column and the median in "Shutdowns & Dismissals."

Finally, and most importantly, even a business suffering pure financial (not economic) distress is not necessarily one worth saving in Chapter 11. To be sure, a distressed business may become profitable again by
reducing its scale of operations, but it may make more sense for the
owner-operator to shut down the existing business and start over again.
Starting from scratch would not make sense if the business used specialized assets, but Table 16 suggests that asset specificity is as insignificant in
reorganized businesses as it is in businesses that suffered shutdown or
dismissal. Measuring asset specificity as the ratio of nonoffice equipment
to total assets, the degree of specificity in reorganizations (8.5%) is only
slightly greater than it is in businesses that suffered shutdown or dismissal
(5.3%). The difference is not statistically significant. And, as we explained in Part II, these measures of specificity are upper bounds. There
209. Others have made the same point. See, e.g., Robert M. Lawless et al., A Glimpse
at Professional Fees and Other Direct Costs in Small Firm Bankruptcies, 1994 U. Ill. L. Rev.
847, 859 ("The bankruptcy petition is a tool for the debtor's advocate who may paint an
overoptimistic picture of the debtor's financial condition and inflate asset values. Under
these circumstances, reporting direct costs as a percentage of total assets would tend to
understate these costs as a fraction of firm value.").
210. See, e.g., Steven N. Kaplan, Federated's Acquisition and Bankruptcy: Lessons
and Implications, 72 Wash. U. L.Q. 1103,'1121-22 (1994) (explaining that economists
have been unable "to distinguish whether poor performance by a firm in financial distress
is caused by the financial distress alone or by the same factors that pushed the firm into
financial distress in the first place"); see also Baird & Rasmussen, End of Bankruptcy, supra
note 59, at 763 (noting that failure of many nineteenth century textile firms "resulted not
from an inability to service debt but rather from an inability to produce revenue that
exceeded ongoing operating costs. In these circumstances, financial distress was
synonymous with economic distress").
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is little reason, then, to think that the reorganizations in our sample represented efforts to preserve going-concern surplus.
TABLE

17:

PERSONAL LIABILITY OF OWNER-MANAGER
Restructurings
Without a
Plan (n=7)
(%)

Going
Concern Sales
(n=8) (%)

65.2

12.5
(.01)

50.0
(.46)

63.3
(.20)

78.3

42.9
(.08)

12.5
(.00)

90.3
(.89)

91.3

57.1
(.03)

50.0
(.01)

All Cases
(n=100)
(%)

Shutdowns
& Dismissals
(n=62) (%)

Personal
Guarantees

55.8

58.5
(.57)

Personal
Tax
Liability

61.2

Any
Personal
Liability

85.0

Reorganizations
(n=23) (%)

Note: Parentheses give p-values of a t-test for the difference between the percentage in that column and
the percentage in "Reorganizations."

4. Why Do Rational EntrepreneursSubmit to the Lock-In Effect? - Why is
Chapter 11 attractive to owner-operators who can downsize their businesses simply by starting over again? We get a sense of the answer by
looking closely at the successful reorganization cases. A typical example
is Luczak Bros.,2 11 in which an entrepreneur entered Chapter 11, confirmed a plan of reorganization, and continued to run the same business
after it emerged from Chapter 11.212 Luczak Brothers is a family business
founded in 1897 that does ornamental plasterwork. 2 13 It encountered
financial distress because it took on an enormous project-the plasterwork for the renovation of the home of the Chicago Symphony Orchestra-and underestimated its costs by $600,000.214 It made mistakes on
other jobs as well. 2 15 Luczak is a classic case of overexpansion and might
seem a poster child for Chapter 11.
Did Chapter 11 preserve any going-concern surplus in this case? No.
This business, like virtually all of those that successfully reorganized, had
little in the way of business-specific assets. By far its biggest asset was
about $470,000 in receivables. 2 16 The other assets included real estate,
several cars, and $10,000 of inventory. 2 17 It had only $20,000 in equipment and a quarter of it was office equipment.2 1 8 James Luczak would
run an ornamental plaster business if Luczak Brothers, Inc., disappeared.
He would continue to employ the same people and exploit the same rela211. In re Luczak Bros., Inc., No. 98-04896 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. July 7, 1999).
212. The firm maintains a website. See Luczak Brothers, Inc., at http://
www.luczakbros.com (last updated Apr. 5, 2003).
213. Second Amended Disclosure Statement at 7-8, In re Luczak Bros., No. 98-04896.
214. Id. at 8.
215. Id. at 3.
216. Schedule B at 2, In re Luczak Bros., No. 98-04896.
217. Schedule A at 1, In re Luczak Bros., No. 98-04896; Schedule B, supra note 216, at
1-2.
218. Schedule B, supra note 216, at 2.
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tionships he always had. There are only modest costs in starting a new
business and no reason at all to encourage him to use the existing corporate entity-Luczak Brothers, Inc.-to conduct his affairs. The existing
legal regime, however, encourages someone in the position of Luczak to
do exactly this.
The overriding issue in Luczak was not keeping specialized assets together or saving jobs, but escaping personal tax liability. Like 80% of
those who confirmed a plan of reorganization in Chapter 11,219 Luczak
invaded trust funds containing employee withholding taxes to keep the
business running. 220 By doing this, he converted what was a corporate
obligation into a personal obligation.2 21 Even though he nominally did
business in limited liability form, James Luczak did not have the option of
walking away from this business and starting another on a clean slate.
Individual liability alone does not bias Luczak towards remaining
with the existing business. Luczak and the corporation are jointly and
severally liable to the IRS. Luczak is obliged to pay the tax whether the
business continues to exist or not. 222 Hence, if personal liability for the
debt was the only issue, he would still choose the path that provided the
best fit with his human capital. In practice, however, James Luczak can
keep the IRS at bay by keeping Luczak Brothers, Inc., alive in Chapter
11.223 In other words, the way in which the IRS handles these sorts of tax
liabilities pushed James Luczak towards running his plaster business
under the aegis of Luczak Brothers, Inc., even though there is little or no
22 4
social benefit from organizing his business this way.
Chapter 11, then, is attractive because it gives owner-operators access
to subsidies unavailable in the marketplace. By filing a corporate Chapter 11 petition, small entrepreneurs can haggle over (and defer payment
of) tax claims and operate, at least temporarily, with a smaller fraction of
their revenues going to service other debt. In this fashion, Chapter 11
encourages owner-operators to remain with an existing business. While
the owner-operator can return to running the old business and be successful, we do not know whether, absent the distortions brought about by
219. See supra Table 17.
220. Second Amended Disclosure Statement, supra note 213, at 3; see also Schedule
E, In re Luczak Bros., No. 98-04896 (listing over $350,000 in withheld taxes owed to IRS and
Illinois Department of Revenue).
221. See supra note 23.
222. I.R.C. § 6672 (Thomson 2005).
223. See IRS, supra note 185.
224. A simpler but similar case is In re Kosick, Inc., No. 98-06215 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
Aug. 17, 1998). The company performs fiberglass and gel-coat repair to boats and trucks.
Amended Proposed Disclosure Statement at 6, In re Kosick, No. 98-06215. Most of the work
is contracted through marinas and consists largely of warranty repairs on new boats. Id. at
6-7. Kosick got into trouble by deciding to construct two sixteen-foot New Jersey speed
skiffs, spending in excess of $30,000 on them. Id. No buyers appeared. The vast majority
(over 97%) of the prepetition debt was owed to the IRS and Illinois state agencies. Id. at 4.
Chapter 11 was merely a way to deal with government.
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Chapter 11, he would have been better off starting a different kind of
business. There is still a lock-in effect. The owner-operator has a powerful incentive to return to his past, regardless of whether he could do better by trying something new.
To be sure, the costs of lock-in are not substantial in many reorganization cases. James Luczak would run an ornamental plaster business
whether Luczak Brothers, Inc. continued or not. To the extent he
needed to change his operations-such as by scaling back the number of
jobs and increasing his supervision of each one-he could do this as well
using the existing legal shell as with another. The lock-in effect of Chapter 11 may be small when financial distress has been brought on by overexpansion. When the best match of the owner-operator's human capital
is a return to a smaller, but more sound business using the same assets
and exploiting the same relationships, Chapter 11 creates relatively few
distortions. Indeed, as Table 18 shows, among the 11 businesses that suffered overexpansion and reorganized, only one subsequently failed (and
it did so four years after exiting bankruptcy).
Overexpansion, however, characterizes only eleven of the twentythree cases that resulted in reorganization. The remaining twelve cases
are a mixed bag, some featuring other classic indicators of financial distress and others suffering some unspecified type of distress. For these
businesses, the costs of Chapter 11 are larger. As Table 18 illustrates, four
failed within one year, five within two, and eight within five. Three of the
four that failed within a year had confirmed reorganization plans that
225
promised repayment of 100% of the claims of unsecured creditors.
When financial distress is brought on by factors other than overexpansion, businesses commonly put forward excessively optimistic reorganization plans and then fail. Chapter 11 encourages these owner-operators to
gamble (using money supplied by creditors and the government) on the
resurrection of failing business ventures.
TABLE

Frequency
Failed within 1 year
Failed within 2 years
Failed within 5 years

18:

CHARACTERISTICS OF REORGANIZATIONS
Overexpansion cases

Asbestos case

Other cases

11
0
0
1

1
0
0
0

11
4
5
8

Thix Enterprises provides an illustration. 22 6 Thomas Hix ran a gasoline and auto service station as Thix Enterprises.22 7 He had purchased
the station in 1995, having been service manager there for several years
225. Among businesses that entered bankruptcy for reasons other than
overexpansion, half confirmed 100% plans. By comparison, only one of the overexpansion
cases involved a 100% plan.
226. In re Thix Enters., No. 98-10184 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. May 19, 1999).
227. Disclosure Statement at 18, In re Thix Enters., No. 98-10184.
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before the acquisition. 228 The business was at best marginally profitable
when Hix purchased it.229 Thix steadily lost money and fell behind in tax
payments. 230 Costs were reduced by slashing payroll from twenty-four to
nine employees, and Hix expected to shrink costs further by reducing
employee health benefits and outsourcing management of the gas
pumps. 23 1 When the IRS threatened to place a lien on its assets, however,
Hix put the corporation in Chapter 11.232 A plan of reorganization was
confirmed, 233 but the problems with the business remained. Amoco refused to renew its lease. 234 It appears that Hix lacked the skills to run this
business and ultimately went to work for an auto service company. 23 5 He
filed his own personal Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in 2002, still encumbered by the IRS obligations of Thix Enterprises. 23 6 Without Chapter 11,
he might have been able to start a different business or confront the fact
that he was not cut out to be an entrepreneur earlier.
Apart from cases of overexpansion, only an odd conjunction of
events leads the owner-operator to want to place a business in Chapter 11
2 37
and for that business to remain a good match for her human capital.
The type of debt that makes Chapter 11 attractive-a tax obligation on
which the owner-operator is personally liable-usually arises only when
the business experiences extreme economic distress. 23 8 Owner-operators
typically invade trust funds (thereby incurring not only personal, but potentially criminal liability2 39) as a last resort. Invasion of trust funds follows from an inability to meet ongoing operating expenses. Unless things
change, the business will fail, and, apart from cases of overexpansion, it is
unlikely that things will change. Few businesses experience economic distress sufficiently severe to lead the owner-operators to invade the trust
funds, yet remain sufficiently sound that running them on a going-forward basis is possible.
228. Id. at 20.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 20-21.
232. Id. at 22.
233. Order Confirming Plan, In re Thix Enters., No. 98-10184.
234. Motion to Convert Case to Chapter 7 at 1, In re Thix Enters., No. 98-10184.
235. Schedule I-Current Income of Individual Debtors, In re Thomas Vincent Hix
et al., No. 02-17761 (Bankr. N.D. Il. June 18, 2002).
236. See Schedule E, In re Thomas Vincent Hix, No. 02-17761 (listing over $200,000
owed to IRS and Illinois Department of Revenue).
237. Again, only four cases in our entire sample involved businesses suffering from a
problem other than overexpansion, reorganizing in Chapter 11, and surviving for more
than five years. See supra Table 18. One faced liability because of the asbestos it once
used in its furnace linings. See Motion to Approve Insurance and Lien Settlement
Agreements, for Injunctive Relief Relating Thereto, to Set Hearing Thereon, and to Limit
Notice Thereof at 1-2, In re M.H. Detrick Co., No. 98-1004 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Feb. 20,
1998).
238. The Eating/Drinking Places in our sample provide the best illustration. See
supra Table 14.
239. See I.R.C. § 6672 (Thomson 2005).
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CONCLUSIONS

Academic and political debates about corporate reorganizations of
small businesses must change. To date, the focal point has been on the
particular business housed inside the corporate entity in bankruptcy and
whether it should be preserved. This makes no sense. In the vast majority of cases, there is no business worth saving. There is instead an ownerentrepreneur who is looking for the best match between her human capital and a business venture. Assessments of Chapter 11 should focus on
how it affects this search and at what cost. Chapter 11 may fare well when
seen from such a vantage point. 240 It may provide "breathing space" that
facilitates the move to a new venture, as the entrepreneur renegotiates
personal guarantees with tax collectors and banks. At the same time,
however, the labor economics approach to Chapter 11 reveals an unappreciated cost. Because Chapter 11 conditions its benefits upon the entrepreneur remaining with the old business, it may unnecessarily delay
her move to a new business that better matches her human capital.
The need to focus upon the entrepreneur rather than the business
was entirely lost in recent efforts to amend the provisions of Chapter 11
that affect small businesses. The newly-enacted legislation, for example,
adds new layers of complexity to the Code. 2 41 It increases reporting requirements, 2 42 limits the exclusivity period to eighteen months,2 43 and
imposes tighter deadlines for submitting a plan and achieving confirmation 244-in an effort to improve monitoring by the court and U.S. Trustee and induce them to "weed out"245 debtors that are unlikely to reor240. It is certainly easier to justify Chapter 11 in the typical case using this approach
than, for example, by pointing to the benefits Chapter 11 offers small general creditors.
See, e.g., Warren & Westbrook, Contracting, supra note 16, at 1200-01 ("The details of the
current bankruptcy system ... can be described generally as constraining the collection
rights of each creditor individually . . . for the benefit of all concerned."). Given that
general creditors receive nothing or close to nothing in the typical case, Chapter 11 can
hardly be defended on the ground that it benefits them. See Baird et al., Dynamics, supra
note 188, at 22-23 (demonstrating that unsecured creditors receive, on average, 18% of
what they are owed and that nonpriority creditors receive nothing in 31% of all cases).
241. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.
109-8, §§ 431-437, 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. (119 Stat. 87) 23, 109-18 (to be codified in scattered
sections of 11 U.S.C.). For helpful analysis of these provisions, see generally Bruce A.
Markell, Small Business Provisions of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005, SL068 ALI-ABA 263 (2005), available at Westlaw, ALI-ABA
Database.
242. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act § 434
(requiring small business debtors to submit period reports on profits, cash flow, and other
financial information); id. § 436 (requiring small business debtor to attach to its
bankruptcy petition "most recent balance sheet, statement of operations, cash-flow
statement, and Federal income tax return").
243. Id. § 437.
244. Id. (obligating small business debtors to submit plans of reorganization no later
than 300 days after order for relief); id. § 438 (directing courts to confirm plans within
forty-five days of submission, provided plans comply with other provisions of Code).
245. See Blum, supra note 146, at 235-46.
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ganize more quickly. Better monitoring and quicker case resolution
seem, in the abstract, like sensible goals for any legal system. The focus,
however, remained upon the business (more specifically, the question of
whether a plan of reorganization will be confirmed) and not on the entrepreneur. Giving an individual a year and a half to reorganize a business is much too long if her skills are better used elsewhere.
The latest reform efforts underscore a more serious problem. The
labor economics approach shows that reforms that focus on the Bankruptcy Code itself are often too narrow. Chapter 11 petitions are often
filed because the small entrepreneur invades trust funds earmarked for
taxes in a last ditch effort to save a business that is destined to fail anyway.
A sensible labor market intervention should focus on the problem for
which Chapter 11 is at best an imperfect solution, such as making it
harder for small entrepreneurs to reach these funds in the first instance.
For example, the law could require entrepreneurs to pay withholding
taxes at the same time they issue paychecks. Such a rule may be feasible
in a world in which electronic fund transfers have become commonplace. 2 46 The rule would remove the single largest obstacle-personal
indebtedness for trust fund taxes-that entrepreneurs in Chapter 11 face
in transitioning to a business that better matches their human capital.
Such a reform-one that might have dramatic consequences for small
business bankruptcies-has nothing to do with Chapter 11.
Other reforms could target the Code itself. Chapter 11 is, as we have
seen, a labor market intervention that offers particular benefits to entrepreneurs who cling to existing business structures. This is yet another
example of a bankruptcy entitlement that deviates from entitlements
available under nonbankruptcy law. Just as the Code allows corporations
to breach collective bargaining duties that are inviolable under federal
labor law,24 7 it also offers small-business entrepreneurs temporary liquidity that is unavailable under laws administered by state and federal agencies, such as the Small Business Administration. Having substantive rules
in bankruptcy differ from those in the nonbankruptcy forums has long
been known to be a bad idea. 24 8 If it is a good idea to offer temporary
liquidity to entrepreneurs with failing businesses, the policy should apply
across the board to all businesses, regardless of whether they are in bankruptcy. It might make sense, then, to expand the services offered by the
Small Business Administration and contract the availability of Chapter 11,
perhaps by making it available to businesses of a certain size or with certain problems (such as overexpansion).

246. To eliminate the problem altogether, the law could require small businesses to
use a third-party provider to issue paychecks and oblige that party to make withholding
payments at the same time. Under such a regime, the entrepreneur would have no ability
to pay workers without also turning over withholding taxes.
247. See 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (2000).
248. See Thomas H. Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy 21-27 (1986).
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These ideas, however, are only tentative and should not obscure a
more important point. The Chapter 11 debate must change. The focus
on rehabilitating the business that has dominated the discussion for decades is fundamentally misguided. Intelligent reform needs to be
grounded instead on the effects of Chapter 11 on entrepreneurs' career
trajectories. Instead of trying to rehabilitate a particular business venture, we should focus on the small entrepreneurs themselves and help
them find the businesses that best match their skills.
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